May 18, 2026

Economics Series 3: Nicholas Hill / Working DOJ / FTC / JetBlue & Spirit / Anti-Trust & Monopolies

Economics Series 3: Nicholas Hill / Working DOJ / FTC / JetBlue & Spirit / Anti-Trust & Monopolies

Nicholas Hill is an accomplished economic expert specializing in antitrust and competition economics. With extensive experience advising private clients, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), he has testified in federal court and the FTC’s administrative court. He has conducted detailed antitrust assessments in industries including agriculture, chemicals, consumer products, healthcare, media and entertainment, publishing, software, and transportation to name a few. His expertise has supported favorable outcomes for clients including merger approvals, divestitures, and settlement agreements from price-fixing to monopolization claims.

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Welcome to another episode of
Come Together

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Mr. Nicholas Hill.
Welcome to the show.

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So happy to have you on how you
doing today.

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Great, happy to be here.
Yes, I appreciate your time.

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I appreciate the generosity with
your time and I'm looking

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forward to hearing and learning
a lot from you.

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I have, I started an economic
series about a year ago and I

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had some fun guests on.
And, and the one thing that I

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did want to start looking a
little bit more into and perhaps

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trying to draw a little more
attention to is the importance

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and the relevance of antitrust,
breaking up monopoly.

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Because I think we live in a
world at the moment where big

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businesses are so enormous that
that the power that they have,

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it's certainly not
unprecedented, but you know, it

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kind of goes and ebbs and flows
with waves throughout history,

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particularly American history.
But but I wanted to just maybe

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understand this a little bit
and, and, and I think you're the

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right person to help me
breakdown some of these ideas in

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a really clear and coherent way.
Sure, happy to help.

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So, so just a little bit on your
background.

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You had some time working at the
DOJ and the FTCDOJ stands for

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the Department of Justice.
The FTC is the Federal Trade

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Commission.
And then you went private and,

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and I don't actually know where
you're working at the moment,

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but yeah, yeah, maybe.
A little background A.

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Little bit about about about
yourself and your past

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experiences.
Yeah.

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So I'll give you some background
and you can cut out all the

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parts that are boring.
So prior to going into

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antitrust, I actually worked in
demographic and health surveys

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in developing countries.
And I did that for about 5

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years.
And for various reasons, I was

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ready to change what I was doing
a little bit.

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And I went back to grad school
to get a PhD.

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And after I did that, when I was
applying to jobs, my supervisor

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at the time told me you should
apply to some government jobs.

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And he said it largely because
he said something not entirely

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flattering, like, yeah, most of
these academic places wouldn't

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hire Someone Like You, so maybe
you should try a government job.

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What made.
And so I did apply to a bunch of

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government.
You'll have to ask him.

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Possibly he was just right.
He was just possibly very

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perceptive.
So anyway, I, I interviewed with

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the Department of Justice
Antitrust Division.

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I didn't really know anything
about antitrust at the time.

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And they just, I heard them
talking about what they did and

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why.
And they they in particular

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talked about mergers.
You know, two companies are

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trying to merge and we have to
determine whether or not that

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would hurt consumers.
And they gave some examples and

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it just really caught my
imagination.

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I liked talking to them.
I thought it was great.

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So, you know, they invited me
out.

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I talked to their group.
I gave a presentation.

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And, you know, the more I talked
to them, the more I liked them

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and the more interested I was.
And, you know, eventually, for

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reasons that it will never be
clear to me, they offered me a

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job and I accepted.
And there was, there was

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definitely a learning
adjustment.

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I mean, I really didn't know
much about antitrust.

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So I learned through talking to
the economist, talking to the

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lawyers, working on cases, it's
really in that sense.

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You know, I had an economics
background on this.

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I have a PhD in it, but a lot of
it was just working with people.

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And so I was there for seven
years.

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I moved to the FTC, as you said,
the Federal Trade Commission.

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They do the same things in
general, but they have different

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industries, like DOJ and FTC
often work on different

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industries.
And I was interested to see how

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do these other interests in
these industries work.

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Do we come have the same
theories, the same ideas?

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And after being there for a
while, I moved back to DOJ to to

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be in a manager's role.
And then after a couple of years

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of that, I went private and I
joined Bates White Economic

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Consulting, which is where I
work today.

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Gotcha.
That's a lot.

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That sounds like quite a trip
to.

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There's a couple of things that
you said that I'm very curious

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about.
Maybe if you could help clarify

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#1 is it seems like the way that
you just phrased it, that the

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end goal or what the purpose of
the DOJ was that your impression

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was, which what got you excited
is that it's that the government

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was there to protect, excuse me,
protect consumers.

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So the, the, so the, the, IT
looked like that the, the

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audience or the people that the,
that the DOJ was looking to

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protect and defend are the, are
the American people, not

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necessarily the corporations
that in fact they'll be trying

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to prohibit them from growing.
Is that correct?

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Yeah, so not necessarily
prohibited from growing, but

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your your first part is
absolutely correct.

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The goal of both the Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade

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Commission is to make sure that
firms don't acquire market power

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or use market power in ways that
harm consumers.

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And so that is really their
foundational focus.

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Now, obviously whenever there's
an election, the the people who

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are in charge of the the
divisions that there's sort of

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the career staff, the people who
are there long term.

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And then there's political staff
who come in and different

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political staff may have
different views.

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And so one administration may be
very focused on breaking up

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monopolies.
One may be very focused on

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merger review.
You know, it really depends on

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their specific orientation.
And.

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Some, yeah.
And you know, the Federal Trade

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Commission, they actually
typically now they currently

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they have two, but they usually
have 5 commissioners, usually

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three from the majority party, 2
from the minority party.

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And what's interesting about
that is when I moved from DOJ to

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FTCI, found out that
commissioners don't always align

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the way you think.
You might think there would be a

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lot of three to two votes where
all the Republicans vote one way

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and all the Democrats the other.
That does happen, for sure.

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But there's also times when all
five of them vote together.

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And there's times when it's 4 to
1, and there's times when it's

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3:00 to 2:00.
But it's not a predictable

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coalition.
So, like, different people have

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different views at DOJ.
There's really usually the one

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decision maker.
Now, of course that person is

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responsible, ultimately the
attorney general.

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But you know, it doesn't have
quite that same structure.

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Right, right.
It's, it's, I'm so happy that

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you made that point because I'm
reading a book now called The

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Unstable Majorities by Morris
Fioran.

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I believe it was his last name.
And, and one thing that he was

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talking about was how the
population is much more

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polarized perhaps than they need
to be.

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And I was curious and, and, and
a lot of social issues are kind

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of worked into the political
parties now in order to help

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deviate, I think people from one
another or radicalize the, the

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extremes from either party.
And I was curious whether that

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kind of same environment exists
within the government itself.

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Because like you did mention,
there are people that come in

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every three, every 4-4 years or
so from, with, with whatever

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respected parties in, in the
position of power.

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And then there are people that
just work there throughout, you

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know, the whole time one way or
the other.

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And they say, OK, well, you'll
be gone in four years and we'll

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still be here in 20s.
So I'm curious.

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So, so, so, so it's very
interesting when you say that

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they're often, you know, 4 to
one or five.

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And OI guess it means that these
individuals, these commissioners

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tend to have their own ideas.
And then instead of judge going

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going partisan one way or the
other, they kind of elaborate.

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They kind of take a look at
what's going on around them and

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base what their decision is
going to be on their own values

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as opposed to just going along
with the party line.

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Yeah.
So that that's a rich question

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and I'll unpack it a little bit
if I can.

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So first of all, in your first
point, yeah, I mean, there is

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this eternal battle between the
civil servants and then the the

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politicals who have their own
political goals, which may or

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may not be what the civil
servants want.

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And I would say in general, the
people at both that I worked

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with at the DOJ and the FTC,
their focus usually is pretty

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heavily on protecting American
consumers.

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Like they they they get paid a
lot less than they would get

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paid in private practice.
And they work really long hours.

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And so they in general, they're
pretty motivated by the mission.

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Now, there are some people may
or may not be so motivated, but

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there's a lot of people who are.
And then yes, you do have

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there's a political overlay
where a particular party may be

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more or against a certain thing.
And sometimes the parties align.

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So one thing that's happened in
the recent past, possibly for

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different reasons, but both of
the major political parties have

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sort of had Amazon, Google,
Facebook in the crosshairs,

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Apple and they've been very
interested in large tech

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companies from the power that
they have and a desire to

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regulate them or not regulate,
sorry to investigate what

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they're doing.
So that's true.

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And then there are other time
periods when they have different

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views and they're sometimes
you're in a period of consensus,

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sometimes you're in a period of
discord.

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And at the moment, with respect
to big tech, there is some

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consensus about they need to be
investigated.

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The reasons why may vary.
And so the prescriptions about

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what should be done may vary,
but all of that's true.

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And then the the final overlay I
just want to put on all of this

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is let's just I'll just give you
a hypothetical situation.

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Let's say Coke said we're
merging with Pepsi and there was

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a big investigation, like, would
this hurt competition for soft

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drinks?
And, you know, the depending on

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which party is in power, they
may have their own view about

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whether that's true or not.
But if the government, whether

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it's the Department of Justice
or the Federal Trade Commission,

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says we want to block this
merger, we think this is going

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to lead to higher prices for
Colas.

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It's going to be the higher
prices for lemon lining soft

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drinks.
We think this needs to be

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blocked.
They then have to go to court

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and they have to convince a
court that this should be

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blocked.
And so then there's this other

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overlay.
Even if you have a big change in

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politics at the level of the
political administration,

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ultimately the either agency has
to typically convince a court.

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And so that's like a yet another
layer, like some federal judge

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is going to review this case.
My experience, I've testified, I

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think now I can't remember it's
seven or eight times in front of

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federal courts that the judges
are super smart.

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They ask a ton of questions,
they're really engaged and it's

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really hard to win those kinds
of cases.

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The, the judges are really going
to dig in and try to understand

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it.
And so all of these parties like

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the, the political parties,
judiciary and then the civil

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servants are involved.
And, and typically the way it

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works, if you have this Coke,
Pepsi, the career staff would

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investigate.
They would say, here's the fact

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pattern, here's what we
recommend.

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And then the political
leadership would make a

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decision, are we going to sue?
Are we not going to sue and

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then, you know, you either move
to court?

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Hey everyone real quick if
you're enjoying the show, click

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subscribe and rate the show. 5
stars helps a time.

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Thanks so much.
Or, or if the parties, if you

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sue the court parties and they
say, OK, you're right, we're

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going to abandon the deal, then
it doesn't move to the

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judiciary, but otherwise you
would move into a trial.

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That's very interesting.
Out of curiosity, I don't know

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if this is something that the
DOJ or the FTC handles say, for

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example, and I want to talk
about this too.

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We're going to get into Spirit
Airlines a little bit.

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But part of what, you know,
Spirit were made spirits so

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00:11:03,480 --> 00:11:06,680
successful and they kind of did
upend the whole flight industry.

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00:11:06,680 --> 00:11:09,400
But I think either them or
Frontier, I'm not sure which one

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00:11:09,400 --> 00:11:11,840
of them came first, but I think
they really radicalized and

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00:11:11,840 --> 00:11:14,160
changed the way almost a similar
way to the way that Netflix

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00:11:14,160 --> 00:11:16,960
affected the streaming and movie
business in a very, you know,

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00:11:16,960 --> 00:11:19,200
they just kind of changed the
whole grounds and the whole

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00:11:19,200 --> 00:11:21,000
under the whole public
perception of the way the

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00:11:21,000 --> 00:11:23,080
business should be or is the way
it works.

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00:11:23,480 --> 00:11:27,960
And now that spirits gone, say
hypothetically, and I've read

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00:11:27,960 --> 00:11:30,480
this that airports that spirits
were flying out of were

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00:11:30,480 --> 00:11:34,760
generally, I think 15 to 20%
cheaper than than airports that

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00:11:34,760 --> 00:11:37,000
spirit would not fly out of.
And one of the reasons why was

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00:11:37,000 --> 00:11:39,640
because they were so competitive
with their pricing, the other,

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00:11:39,800 --> 00:11:44,080
the other organizations and
other airlines had to lower

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00:11:44,080 --> 00:11:45,880
their prices just to compete
with them.

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00:11:45,880 --> 00:11:48,560
But now that that's gone,
there's no barrier to or there's

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00:11:48,560 --> 00:11:53,080
nothing to stop necessarily
these airlines from now marking

239
00:11:53,080 --> 00:11:54,720
up their flights to whatever it
is.

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00:11:54,720 --> 00:11:57,560
And in fact, we do know, of
course, circumstantially due to

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00:11:57,560 --> 00:12:00,840
the war right now, that air
travel is extremely expensive

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00:12:00,840 --> 00:12:02,200
because of the rising cost of
fuel.

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00:12:02,240 --> 00:12:06,960
So does DOJ get involved when a
whole industry becomes too

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00:12:06,960 --> 00:12:10,200
expensive for, you know, for
people to be able to kind of

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00:12:10,200 --> 00:12:13,560
participate in, or is that not
up their Roadhouse?

246
00:12:13,680 --> 00:12:14,840
Yeah.
So it could.

247
00:12:15,560 --> 00:12:18,320
So let me let me step back and
I'll start with your point about

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00:12:19,040 --> 00:12:23,080
airlines.
So, and I'm not a, I've worked

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00:12:23,080 --> 00:12:25,280
on the industry a number of
times, including I worked on

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00:12:25,280 --> 00:12:27,800
JetBlue, Spirit on behalf of
JetBlue and Spirit.

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00:12:28,640 --> 00:12:32,040
So, so let me just walk back
there a little.

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00:12:32,040 --> 00:12:35,240
So my understanding of the
general industry trends, and

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00:12:35,240 --> 00:12:38,600
some of this happened before I
was involved, was that after

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00:12:38,600 --> 00:12:43,000
deregulation, what sort of
happened is airlines moved from,

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00:12:43,600 --> 00:12:46,680
you could think of them as being
high quality, high price.

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00:12:46,680 --> 00:12:49,720
New people came in competing and
saying like, look, I really

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00:12:49,720 --> 00:12:53,080
don't care if it's luxury.
I just want to get from New York

258
00:12:53,080 --> 00:12:56,160
to Washington or I want to get
from Miami to Milwaukee.

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00:12:56,160 --> 00:12:58,480
And I want to do it as cheaply
as I can.

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00:12:58,800 --> 00:13:01,760
And there's been a series of
people who have entered and LED

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00:13:01,760 --> 00:13:04,360
to lower fares.
And the most famous probably,

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00:13:04,360 --> 00:13:06,480
and there's been a lot of
economic papers written about it

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00:13:06,480 --> 00:13:11,000
is Southwest who entered flying
from point to point.

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00:13:11,040 --> 00:13:14,520
They didn't have the same
structure as United or Delta or

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00:13:14,520 --> 00:13:16,440
American, who often have
networks.

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00:13:16,440 --> 00:13:19,240
They just were flying place to
place and they entered with low

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00:13:19,240 --> 00:13:22,320
fares and lots of flights.
And they really reshape the

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00:13:22,320 --> 00:13:23,720
industry.
There's, as I said, there's a

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00:13:23,720 --> 00:13:26,240
ton of economic papers looking
at that and finding that

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00:13:26,240 --> 00:13:28,440
Southwest had a really important
impact.

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00:13:29,080 --> 00:13:31,520
And then over time, other people
entered.

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00:13:31,520 --> 00:13:34,480
There was AirTran and there's
there's just been a whole long

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00:13:34,480 --> 00:13:38,200
series of them.
And so the what the way people

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00:13:38,200 --> 00:13:41,320
often talk about the industry
now is the legacy carriers, by

275
00:13:41,320 --> 00:13:44,920
which they mean often United,
Delta and American.

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00:13:44,920 --> 00:13:47,760
So they have these networks and
hubs that fly.

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00:13:47,960 --> 00:13:51,160
If you're in a small airport,
you usually fly to a big airport

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00:13:51,160 --> 00:13:52,560
and then you fly to where you're
going.

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00:13:52,760 --> 00:13:55,760
And then there's the point to
point low cost carriers.

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00:13:55,760 --> 00:13:58,760
So like Southwest was the
classic example.

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00:13:58,920 --> 00:14:01,200
JetBlue is often put into this
category.

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00:14:01,400 --> 00:14:04,800
You can get a flight for less
and you'll fly place to place a

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00:14:04,800 --> 00:14:06,880
Legion.
Well, they're going to be in an

284
00:14:06,880 --> 00:14:10,200
entirely different category.
But SW famously, they just gave

285
00:14:10,200 --> 00:14:11,800
you peanuts.
Like look, if you're looking for

286
00:14:11,800 --> 00:14:14,000
a fancy dinner, that's not going
to be us.

287
00:14:14,080 --> 00:14:16,880
And that attracted customers who
just wanted to fly.

288
00:14:16,880 --> 00:14:18,360
Like I don't need a fancy
dinner.

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00:14:18,360 --> 00:14:19,640
I'll eat when I get to the other
end.

290
00:14:19,800 --> 00:14:26,080
And then Spirit Allegiant
Frontier Velo, there's a whole

291
00:14:26,080 --> 00:14:27,720
bunch of Velo.
Sorry.

292
00:14:27,720 --> 00:14:29,840
There's a whole bunch of what
are we then called ultra low

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00:14:29,840 --> 00:14:32,200
cost carriers.
Like they cut it down even

294
00:14:32,200 --> 00:14:33,760
further.
Like do you want a pillow?

295
00:14:33,760 --> 00:14:35,200
If you do, you're going to have
to pay for it.

296
00:14:35,640 --> 00:14:37,360
And do you want any kind of food
or drink?

297
00:14:37,600 --> 00:14:39,360
You're going to pay for it.
You want a blanket, you're

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00:14:39,360 --> 00:14:41,280
paying for it.
You want a bag, you pay for it.

299
00:14:41,560 --> 00:14:44,040
So it's like the ultimate.
You can get a flight for like

300
00:14:44,040 --> 00:14:47,760
rock bottom and it just as an
FYI, there was a company in

301
00:14:47,760 --> 00:14:50,040
Europe, I think, as far as I
know, they're still around

302
00:14:50,040 --> 00:14:54,040
EasyJet who just flies.
Really, really cheap prices.

303
00:14:54,040 --> 00:14:57,400
And that that that general idea
was popular with a lot of

304
00:14:57,400 --> 00:14:59,280
consumers.
Like if you don't have a lot of

305
00:14:59,280 --> 00:15:02,240
money, you don't pay a lot to
fly, but you do want to get from

306
00:15:02,240 --> 00:15:04,080
point A to point B in just a
couple hours.

307
00:15:04,080 --> 00:15:07,600
And so that that's sort of what
happened in A in a very high

308
00:15:07,600 --> 00:15:09,880
sense.
And then one thing that has

309
00:15:09,880 --> 00:15:12,920
happened is those ultra low cost
carriers are usually the easiest

310
00:15:12,920 --> 00:15:14,760
to enter.
Like if you wanted you and I

311
00:15:14,760 --> 00:15:17,720
wanted to start an airline, we
just need to round up a couple

312
00:15:17,720 --> 00:15:20,960
of airplanes and we and some
pilots and we'll fly back and

313
00:15:20,960 --> 00:15:22,360
forth between a couple of
cities.

314
00:15:22,360 --> 00:15:25,800
And so it's pretty common that
people enter there, that legacy

315
00:15:25,800 --> 00:15:30,240
airline space, the United, the
Americans, the Deltas, the very

316
00:15:30,240 --> 00:15:33,120
large airlines.
You know, I, I just named the

317
00:15:33,120 --> 00:15:35,640
three that people know about.
I guess you could add Southwest

318
00:15:35,640 --> 00:15:38,680
now as a very large airline, but
it's really hard to enter up

319
00:15:38,680 --> 00:15:40,840
there.
And also ultra, as we found with

320
00:15:40,840 --> 00:15:43,560
Spirit, ultra low cost carriers
run out of money, like they're

321
00:15:43,560 --> 00:15:45,280
operating on really tight
margins.

322
00:15:45,280 --> 00:15:48,280
And if something goes wrong,
like there's a shock to the cost

323
00:15:48,280 --> 00:15:52,200
of fuel, they can all fail.
And so coming now finally all

324
00:15:52,200 --> 00:15:55,960
the way back to your question,
like both of the agencies at a

325
00:15:55,960 --> 00:15:59,480
high level, they, they keep,
they, they are interested in

326
00:15:59,480 --> 00:16:02,280
what's happening in industries
and they typically specialize.

327
00:16:02,280 --> 00:16:05,840
So DOJ works on airlines, FEC
generally does not.

328
00:16:05,960 --> 00:16:09,320
And if they heard like everyone
is raising prices, they might

329
00:16:09,320 --> 00:16:12,240
launch an investigation to say
is this, our price is high

330
00:16:12,240 --> 00:16:14,440
because fuel is high.
So it's expensive for the

331
00:16:14,440 --> 00:16:18,000
airlines or are prices high for
some other reason, some reason,

332
00:16:18,000 --> 00:16:20,280
like competitions being
restrained in some way?

333
00:16:20,360 --> 00:16:23,680
And so that can happen.
Like, for example, a lot of the

334
00:16:23,680 --> 00:16:26,360
investigations into, you know,
there was a whole bunch of them

335
00:16:26,360 --> 00:16:29,640
into Amazon and Google,
etcetera, The big tech

336
00:16:29,640 --> 00:16:32,920
companies, those came out of
people saying these companies

337
00:16:32,920 --> 00:16:35,200
have too much power is leading
to higher prices.

338
00:16:35,200 --> 00:16:37,720
We want to investigate.
And when that happens, either

339
00:16:37,720 --> 00:16:39,880
the federal government could do
it or some states do it.

340
00:16:39,960 --> 00:16:44,400
So, you know, New York has been
active, California, Texas,

341
00:16:44,920 --> 00:16:46,760
sometimes states investigate
those things.

342
00:16:46,840 --> 00:16:48,240
Yeah.
And I want to I want to ask

343
00:16:48,240 --> 00:16:49,640
about that.
I want to stick on the I want to

344
00:16:49,640 --> 00:16:51,040
actually definitely want to talk
about that.

345
00:16:51,040 --> 00:16:53,440
I want to stick on the airline
question the topic just a little

346
00:16:53,440 --> 00:16:56,920
bit more because I want to hear
about your experience with the

347
00:16:56,920 --> 00:17:00,520
JetBlue case.
I want to hear what the train of

348
00:17:00,520 --> 00:17:04,040
thought or what the, what the
business plan was and why he was

349
00:17:04,040 --> 00:17:07,760
ultimately struck down.
And one of those something

350
00:17:07,760 --> 00:17:09,599
curious.
I don't, I don't believe in,

351
00:17:09,599 --> 00:17:11,839
correct me if I'm wrong.
I remember when JetBlue started,

352
00:17:11,880 --> 00:17:15,000
everyone was enthralled by it.
They had great snacks.

353
00:17:15,000 --> 00:17:17,839
They had the first cable
television, you know, and the

354
00:17:17,839 --> 00:17:20,119
seats in front of you.
And I think they had Wi-Fi in

355
00:17:20,119 --> 00:17:22,240
their flights and they were
really considered premier

356
00:17:22,240 --> 00:17:23,720
airline.
I remember I was jealous every

357
00:17:23,720 --> 00:17:26,160
time I I heard that my friends
are flying JetBlue and I was

358
00:17:26,160 --> 00:17:28,720
flying American.
And then somewhere along the

359
00:17:28,720 --> 00:17:30,880
line, you know, something,
something happened.

360
00:17:30,880 --> 00:17:33,920
And you know, I, I, it's funny
because I don't, I don't think I

361
00:17:33,920 --> 00:17:35,800
ever age until I talk to my high
school students.

362
00:17:35,800 --> 00:17:38,480
And that's when I realized how,
how much older I am than than I

363
00:17:38,480 --> 00:17:40,880
think I am.
But you know, so, but so, so it

364
00:17:40,880 --> 00:17:42,920
looks like that, that that
company kind of went from a flip

365
00:17:42,920 --> 00:17:46,040
to a premier airline to to a
budget airline or an ultra

366
00:17:46,040 --> 00:17:47,520
budget, depending on I don't
know how you're going to

367
00:17:47,520 --> 00:17:50,120
categorize it, but what is that?
How does that happen?

368
00:17:50,200 --> 00:17:52,520
And then if you could maybe walk
me through the case a little

369
00:17:52,520 --> 00:17:53,760
bit, I'd be really interested in
hearing about.

370
00:17:53,760 --> 00:17:56,160
That sure, I'll look through
both of those at a high level

371
00:17:56,160 --> 00:17:59,720
based on my experience.
So JetBlue in some sense

372
00:17:59,720 --> 00:18:02,920
positioned itself as you get a
little bit of the best of both

373
00:18:02,920 --> 00:18:04,920
worlds.
You we're going to have, as you

374
00:18:04,920 --> 00:18:09,560
say, they had comfortable seats,
extra leg room, other perks like

375
00:18:09,560 --> 00:18:13,320
free Wi-Fi, you know, look good
in their snacks, all those kinds

376
00:18:13,320 --> 00:18:15,760
of things.
And so they were sort of saying,

377
00:18:15,760 --> 00:18:19,040
look, you can get the high
quality and we're also going to

378
00:18:19,040 --> 00:18:23,240
charge less than the larger
carriers like American United

379
00:18:23,320 --> 00:18:27,080
and Delta and Southwest.
So that was sort of their pitch

380
00:18:27,080 --> 00:18:31,360
that in between space spirit was
we are flying, this is going to

381
00:18:31,360 --> 00:18:34,680
be a rock bottom fair.
You're going to fly for cheap.

382
00:18:35,200 --> 00:18:37,960
And then at the other end, you
have the legacy carriers who

383
00:18:37,960 --> 00:18:41,640
offer, you know, first class or
business class, more high touch,

384
00:18:41,680 --> 00:18:45,160
you know, sort of experience and
also like broader networks and

385
00:18:45,160 --> 00:18:47,880
like broader frequent Flyers.
Like it's surprising how many

386
00:18:47,880 --> 00:18:51,320
people you run into are like, I
only fly Delta or I only fly

387
00:18:51,320 --> 00:18:54,080
American.
Yeah, United cause all my points

388
00:18:54,240 --> 00:18:56,880
and I love my points and I want
them and that's why.

389
00:18:56,920 --> 00:18:59,680
And so they have those broad
networks where as most of the

390
00:18:59,680 --> 00:19:01,800
other airlines just aren't big
enough to do that.

391
00:19:01,800 --> 00:19:03,440
Southwest is also in that
category.

392
00:19:04,080 --> 00:19:07,960
And so the, the genesis of the
deal, the thesis for JetBlue was

393
00:19:08,040 --> 00:19:11,600
look, we when we enter a route
and you know, we looked, we

394
00:19:11,600 --> 00:19:13,360
analyzed this and found this to
be true.

395
00:19:13,520 --> 00:19:16,720
When we enter a route, prices
come down from the large

396
00:19:16,720 --> 00:19:19,560
carriers.
So United, American, Delta,

397
00:19:19,800 --> 00:19:23,760
Southwest, our quality is close
enough to them that they respond

398
00:19:23,800 --> 00:19:27,000
and they lower prices, but we're
really be struggling to get

399
00:19:27,000 --> 00:19:30,880
additional air airplanes and to
enter into more routes.

400
00:19:30,880 --> 00:19:33,400
Like we'd love to be competing
in more places, but we just

401
00:19:33,400 --> 00:19:36,760
don't have the aircraft.
And so they in some sense saw

402
00:19:36,800 --> 00:19:39,280
this as an opportunity.
And I, by the way, I'm just

403
00:19:39,280 --> 00:19:41,360
speaking for myself.
The JetBlue people may tell you

404
00:19:41,360 --> 00:19:43,760
something completely different,
but this was my perception, just

405
00:19:43,760 --> 00:19:47,360
working on behalf of them.
We can get all these additional

406
00:19:47,360 --> 00:19:51,400
airplanes and we can put more
pressure on the big, what I'll

407
00:19:51,400 --> 00:19:54,200
just call the big four just for
the purpose of this discussion,

408
00:19:54,800 --> 00:19:58,080
United, American, Delta and
Southwest.

409
00:19:58,520 --> 00:20:02,040
And something like 80% of all
flights in the country are on

410
00:20:02,040 --> 00:20:05,080
those four major carriers.
And so their thesis was if we

411
00:20:05,080 --> 00:20:06,840
could do this.
We're going to take those

412
00:20:06,840 --> 00:20:08,640
planes.
We're going to refit them to be

413
00:20:08,640 --> 00:20:11,360
like JetBlue planes, more
legroom than you would have had

414
00:20:11,360 --> 00:20:14,600
on Spirit, free Wi-Fi, good
snacks, you know, all that

415
00:20:14,600 --> 00:20:17,200
stuff.
And so we analyzed this and we

416
00:20:17,200 --> 00:20:20,200
did find our work was consistent
with JetBlue.

417
00:20:20,200 --> 00:20:23,760
When they entered, they put more
pressure on the large, the four

418
00:20:23,760 --> 00:20:26,200
largest carriers than other
carriers did.

419
00:20:26,720 --> 00:20:31,280
And so and then the the DOJ
story though was wait a minute,

420
00:20:31,440 --> 00:20:34,440
that may all be true, but there
are some routes today where

421
00:20:34,440 --> 00:20:38,080
Spirit competes with JetBlue.
So I'll just take a made-up

422
00:20:38,080 --> 00:20:39,440
route.
Let's just, and this is

423
00:20:39,440 --> 00:20:42,040
completely made-up because I
don't remember, let's say Fort

424
00:20:42,040 --> 00:20:44,640
Myers to Cincinnati.
They're the only two people

425
00:20:44,640 --> 00:20:46,760
flying that.
And today they're competing

426
00:20:46,920 --> 00:20:49,840
customers on that route.
And what's going to happen is

427
00:20:50,000 --> 00:20:52,560
now people flying from
Cincinnati to Fort Myers are

428
00:20:52,560 --> 00:20:56,200
going to have to pay more.
And our counter argument was,

429
00:20:56,200 --> 00:20:58,840
OK, but JetBlue is going to
enter a whole bunch of new

430
00:20:58,840 --> 00:21:01,360
routes, put pressure on the
airlines that most people

431
00:21:01,360 --> 00:21:03,720
actually fly with.
So that's going to benefit a lot

432
00:21:03,720 --> 00:21:06,680
of consumers.
And so, and then another part of

433
00:21:06,680 --> 00:21:10,400
it was, look, ultra low cost
carriers, they're constantly

434
00:21:10,400 --> 00:21:14,720
breeze entering A Velo, entering
a legion, entering, expanding.

435
00:21:14,720 --> 00:21:16,520
There's always new entrants
there.

436
00:21:16,560 --> 00:21:19,760
And so you shouldn't be too
worried about Spirit

437
00:21:19,760 --> 00:21:22,960
disappearing because it'll be
replaced and we'll use Spirits

438
00:21:22,960 --> 00:21:25,160
planes.
And Spirit had nice new planes,

439
00:21:25,160 --> 00:21:27,800
just FYI.
So that was sort of the

440
00:21:27,800 --> 00:21:31,080
battleground DOJ saying we're
going to lose this competition.

441
00:21:31,080 --> 00:21:33,520
We like this competition between
JetBlue and Spirit.

442
00:21:33,800 --> 00:21:36,520
We were saying you may lose that
competition, but you're going to

443
00:21:36,520 --> 00:21:40,480
gain additional competition.
And the court eventually my

444
00:21:40,480 --> 00:21:42,960
reading of what the court said
was I think it's true that you

445
00:21:42,960 --> 00:21:44,560
would get this additional
competition.

446
00:21:44,720 --> 00:21:47,320
I think that's good.
But I think that there are a lot

447
00:21:47,320 --> 00:21:50,120
of people who like flying on
Spirit and they're going to lose

448
00:21:50,120 --> 00:21:53,720
their choice because the idea
was to replace the Spirit planes

449
00:21:53,720 --> 00:21:55,760
and make them JetBlue planes.
So they'd be a little more

450
00:21:55,760 --> 00:21:57,720
expensive, they'd be higher
touch.

451
00:21:57,880 --> 00:22:00,160
And he the court was saying, but
there are people who don't want

452
00:22:00,160 --> 00:22:01,960
that.
And I'm not convinced that the

453
00:22:01,960 --> 00:22:05,640
smaller ultra low cost carriers
could expand and replace that

454
00:22:05,640 --> 00:22:08,160
lost competition.
And so that's essentially what

455
00:22:08,160 --> 00:22:10,200
happened.
And then obviously in the since

456
00:22:10,200 --> 00:22:13,720
then Spirit went bankrupt, it's
not clear where its planes are

457
00:22:13,720 --> 00:22:15,600
going to go.
You know, there's been a lot of

458
00:22:15,600 --> 00:22:19,240
people who've lost access to
that service, and so that didn't

459
00:22:19,240 --> 00:22:21,880
turn out very well.
Retrospectively, you know the

460
00:22:21,880 --> 00:22:25,840
bankruptcy wasn't a thing.
Not at all not at all.

461
00:22:26,360 --> 00:22:29,160
I, I that that the whole
deliberation process is very

462
00:22:29,160 --> 00:22:32,360
interesting and it's really
fascinating to hear how, what,

463
00:22:32,360 --> 00:22:35,240
what, what the arguments kind of
came down to in the sense that

464
00:22:35,440 --> 00:22:39,120
also because if the federal
government was really concerned

465
00:22:39,120 --> 00:22:43,600
about losing that route to all
to that, that, that customers

466
00:22:43,600 --> 00:22:47,280
wouldn't have the opportunity to
take an economically feasible

467
00:22:47,400 --> 00:22:49,440
flight, you know, from
Cincinnati to Fort Myers.

468
00:22:49,440 --> 00:22:53,040
Hypothetically, we do have
airlines like Frontier and

469
00:22:53,040 --> 00:22:55,360
Allegiant.
And there I, I mean, I, I would

470
00:22:55,360 --> 00:23:00,400
imagine that the natural, the
natural nature of competition is

471
00:23:00,400 --> 00:23:03,600
that someone will emerge or
something will emerge to fill in

472
00:23:03,600 --> 00:23:06,080
that spot.
Don't we, don't we believe that

473
00:23:06,080 --> 00:23:08,840
or wouldn't you argue or make, I
guess you did right representing

474
00:23:08,840 --> 00:23:12,040
JetBlue that, that, that, that
someone else would just step in

475
00:23:12,040 --> 00:23:13,640
and, and, and take that over.
Yeah.

476
00:23:13,640 --> 00:23:17,240
So there was testimony on this
point of the trial and in

477
00:23:17,240 --> 00:23:19,720
general, I would say
characterizing it at a high

478
00:23:19,720 --> 00:23:21,720
level from when I was sitting in
the courtroom.

479
00:23:21,840 --> 00:23:25,480
The ultra low cost Carrier said,
if, if there is an opportunity,

480
00:23:25,480 --> 00:23:29,200
you know, if Spirit exits are
because of the merger and prices

481
00:23:29,200 --> 00:23:32,720
go up, we're always looking for
routes we can enter and compete

482
00:23:32,840 --> 00:23:36,400
and we are definitely going to
take advantage of that.

483
00:23:37,120 --> 00:23:40,760
The the, the counter argument
from DOJ was lipid Spirit is the

484
00:23:40,760 --> 00:23:43,520
largest and most influential of
these.

485
00:23:43,520 --> 00:23:45,080
It would be hard to replace
them.

486
00:23:45,440 --> 00:23:48,360
And so that's sort of and the
court was persuaded by that.

487
00:23:48,400 --> 00:23:50,960
And that was, I think, I mean, I
think that I'm, again, I'm

488
00:23:51,000 --> 00:23:52,760
reading between the lines in the
court's opinion.

489
00:23:53,280 --> 00:23:55,680
And so the court said this would
be a really serious loss.

490
00:23:55,680 --> 00:24:00,160
I don't know that I I don't know
that the court appreciated the

491
00:24:00,440 --> 00:24:03,640
OR understood the because it
wasn't super clear at the time

492
00:24:03,880 --> 00:24:08,400
concluding to me that how much
at risk Spirit was of bankruptcy

493
00:24:08,440 --> 00:24:11,520
and it they started running into
financial problems pretty

494
00:24:11,520 --> 00:24:15,240
quickly afterwards.
And also just context, I don't

495
00:24:15,240 --> 00:24:17,760
know if you know, but there was
also prior to the merger deal

496
00:24:17,760 --> 00:24:23,440
between JetBlue and Spirit,
Spirit had a, an agreement with

497
00:24:23,440 --> 00:24:26,240
or was being coordinated by
Frontier and there was an idea

498
00:24:26,240 --> 00:24:30,120
to Frontier and Spirit merge.
And so there was a big tussle

499
00:24:30,120 --> 00:24:32,800
between who would try to merge
and eventually Spirit and jet

500
00:24:32,800 --> 00:24:35,480
flow emerge.
The Spirit and Frontier would

501
00:24:35,480 --> 00:24:38,320
have also been interesting.
I didn't personally work on that

502
00:24:38,320 --> 00:24:40,200
or analyze that.
That would have been the two

503
00:24:40,200 --> 00:24:43,000
largest ultra low cost carrier
purging.

504
00:24:43,000 --> 00:24:45,480
And, you know, there are
problems.

505
00:24:46,680 --> 00:24:49,520
It would certainly have gotten a
hard look from the agency to

506
00:24:49,520 --> 00:24:52,000
say, wait a minute, you've got
the two biggest now.

507
00:24:52,000 --> 00:24:53,080
Maybe they would have cleared
it.

508
00:24:53,080 --> 00:24:54,960
I don't know.
I, I didn't work on that.

509
00:24:54,960 --> 00:24:57,720
I didn't analyze it.
But they're also pretty similar.

510
00:24:57,840 --> 00:25:00,560
And whereas JetBlue and Spirit,
at least, were relatively

511
00:25:00,600 --> 00:25:02,640
different from each other.
So when you're getting called

512
00:25:02,640 --> 00:25:05,720
to, to testify on this on, on
the, on this stuff, or you're

513
00:25:05,720 --> 00:25:11,200
called to represent a company
like JetBlue, how, what's,

514
00:25:11,200 --> 00:25:13,600
what's your process for learning
the argument?

515
00:25:13,600 --> 00:25:15,280
What's your process for
defending them?

516
00:25:15,280 --> 00:25:16,520
What's the process for your
homework?

517
00:25:16,520 --> 00:25:18,600
How do you go about preparing
yourself for this?

518
00:25:18,600 --> 00:25:22,160
Because I mean, you're going,
you're, you're kind of getting

519
00:25:22,160 --> 00:25:24,760
brought into a whole world.
And I mean, you know, there's so

520
00:25:24,760 --> 00:25:26,840
many different universes you
could talk about supermarkets

521
00:25:26,840 --> 00:25:29,960
and airlines and, and studios
and tickets and everything like

522
00:25:29,960 --> 00:25:32,080
that.
And you got to learn about all

523
00:25:32,080 --> 00:25:33,720
these worlds.
And these are complicated worlds

524
00:25:33,720 --> 00:25:35,880
that you have to dive into.
How much time do you generally

525
00:25:35,880 --> 00:25:37,760
have to prepare?
How do you go about that?

526
00:25:37,840 --> 00:25:38,960
What's that like?
Yeah.

527
00:25:38,960 --> 00:25:43,040
So that, that is 1 reason why I
love working on antitrust and it

528
00:25:43,240 --> 00:25:46,120
keeps it fresh.
Like each new case you work on

529
00:25:46,240 --> 00:25:49,960
is like some new industry where
they compete in a different way

530
00:25:49,960 --> 00:25:52,840
and you have to figure out who's
competing with whom.

531
00:25:52,840 --> 00:25:55,480
How does this business work?
What are they really selling?

532
00:25:55,480 --> 00:25:58,080
Who's supplying them?
You have to understand all of

533
00:25:58,080 --> 00:26:00,400
those details.
And that is just, it's both

534
00:26:00,400 --> 00:26:04,640
sometimes extremely complicated
and it's also it's almost always

535
00:26:04,880 --> 00:26:09,440
really worthwhile to learn and
exciting to you.

536
00:26:09,520 --> 00:26:12,000
So you do it a lot of ways.
You read documents, you read

537
00:26:12,000 --> 00:26:15,480
about the industry generally you
talk to people in the industry.

538
00:26:15,640 --> 00:26:19,320
And so, you know, I should just
say also stepping back a tiny

539
00:26:19,320 --> 00:26:22,440
bit, I work both for firms.
So, for example, on JetBlue

540
00:26:22,440 --> 00:26:24,360
Spirit, I worked on behalf of
the parties.

541
00:26:26,040 --> 00:26:28,640
I also worked on the Kroger,
Albertson's merger, which is

542
00:26:28,640 --> 00:26:32,160
where the FTC challenged that
merger and they won in court.

543
00:26:32,200 --> 00:26:34,400
The court ended up blocking that
merger there.

544
00:26:34,400 --> 00:26:36,600
I testified on behalf of the
FTC.

545
00:26:36,600 --> 00:26:38,760
So I was testifying on behalf of
the government.

546
00:26:38,760 --> 00:26:41,520
And so I've, I've testified
throughout my career pretty

547
00:26:41,520 --> 00:26:44,360
evenly for both sides.
And that that's a key point.

548
00:26:44,360 --> 00:26:46,760
And it goes to your question.
Like, the first thing I try to

549
00:26:46,760 --> 00:26:50,240
do is look at the data, look at
the documents, look at the facts

550
00:26:50,400 --> 00:26:54,360
and try to determine would this
merger, say, have an impact on

551
00:26:54,360 --> 00:26:56,920
competition?
Would it make consumers worse

552
00:26:56,920 --> 00:26:59,400
off?
Or, you know, is this one where

553
00:26:59,600 --> 00:27:01,800
there's already plenty of
competitors present in the

554
00:27:01,800 --> 00:27:03,960
industry, it's not likely to
have a big effect.

555
00:27:04,480 --> 00:27:08,440
And so that's because, you know,
unlike the lawyers whose job is

556
00:27:08,440 --> 00:27:11,880
to advocate for their client, as
an economic expert, your job is

557
00:27:11,880 --> 00:27:14,680
to tell the truth like you are
under oath and everything you

558
00:27:14,680 --> 00:27:17,360
say in court has to be the truth
and the whole truth.

559
00:27:17,880 --> 00:27:21,240
And so if you don't believe,
whichever side you're with, you

560
00:27:21,240 --> 00:27:23,880
tell them as soon as you can.
Like I by the way, I don't

561
00:27:23,880 --> 00:27:26,440
think, I think if you're talking
to the parties, I think your

562
00:27:26,440 --> 00:27:29,160
deal is anti competitive, you
should find a different expert.

563
00:27:29,520 --> 00:27:31,480
Or if you're talking to the
government, I don't think this

564
00:27:31,480 --> 00:27:33,960
deal's a problem.
So probably find somebody else.

565
00:27:34,120 --> 00:27:36,440
Those are always awkward
conversations to have.

566
00:27:36,920 --> 00:27:38,720
But ultimately you have to tell
the truth.

567
00:27:38,720 --> 00:27:41,880
So you know, that's that's the
first part.

568
00:27:41,880 --> 00:27:44,160
And but it is you're right, it's
fascinating.

569
00:27:44,160 --> 00:27:47,240
You end up becoming, for a
while, an expert in a part of

570
00:27:47,240 --> 00:27:50,520
the world that sometimes, you
know, the very first case I ever

571
00:27:50,520 --> 00:27:53,360
testified on involved this
chemical called titanium

572
00:27:53,360 --> 00:27:56,400
dioxide.
It's used in paints to make them

573
00:27:56,400 --> 00:27:59,280
brighter, for example, like
white make it really white.

574
00:27:59,800 --> 00:28:02,000
Sometimes it's used in other
things, you know, to make the

575
00:28:02,000 --> 00:28:05,160
like the the different kind,
different kinds are used for

576
00:28:05,160 --> 00:28:07,880
different products, but it's
sometimes used in toothpaste to

577
00:28:07,880 --> 00:28:10,240
make toothpaste look very white
and bright.

578
00:28:10,960 --> 00:28:13,240
I didn't know this product
existed before I worked on it.

579
00:28:13,320 --> 00:28:15,520
I had not the slightest clue
what it was.

580
00:28:15,880 --> 00:28:18,200
And it turns out there are
different ways of making it.

581
00:28:18,480 --> 00:28:20,360
Different people compete to make
it.

582
00:28:21,080 --> 00:28:24,480
And so that whole process of
learning and then you then you

583
00:28:24,480 --> 00:28:27,040
have to understand how does the
economics of the industry work?

584
00:28:27,040 --> 00:28:29,720
It's just fascinating and you
just learn something new every

585
00:28:29,720 --> 00:28:32,040
day and you interact with a lot
of people, which is fun.

586
00:28:33,040 --> 00:28:35,320
I bet it sounds incredible.
It really sounds very cool.

587
00:28:35,320 --> 00:28:38,480
And as someone that you know,
loves doing this just, you know,

588
00:28:38,480 --> 00:28:40,720
just for fun, just because I
think this is valuable and I

589
00:28:40,720 --> 00:28:43,000
think that people, I think these
are important things for people

590
00:28:43,000 --> 00:28:44,760
to learn.
I think the pursuit of

591
00:28:44,760 --> 00:28:46,080
information in general is
awesome.

592
00:28:46,080 --> 00:28:49,280
If you could do that as as, As
for a living, then then all the

593
00:28:49,280 --> 00:28:54,120
credit to you for sure.
Do do people make decisions as

594
00:28:54,120 --> 00:28:58,360
to whether or not how they're
going to conduct business moves

595
00:28:58,360 --> 00:29:02,000
or attempt to make business
choices based on the political

596
00:29:02,000 --> 00:29:04,120
parties that are in charge at
the time?

597
00:29:04,120 --> 00:29:07,480
So, for example, Netflix and I'm
not sorry any I'm not saying

598
00:29:07,640 --> 00:29:09,240
spared JetBlue.
Again, I don't know.

599
00:29:09,400 --> 00:29:10,760
We can stick with stick with the
same example.

600
00:29:10,760 --> 00:29:14,640
Would they be inclined in the
same way to try to make the deal

601
00:29:14,640 --> 00:29:19,000
with a left or right candidate
in, you know, in the executive

602
00:29:19,240 --> 00:29:22,480
office or would they typically
it doesn't make a difference.

603
00:29:22,480 --> 00:29:25,160
The DOJ is pretty objective or
at least representatives that

604
00:29:25,160 --> 00:29:28,720
are working there full time like
yourself that are that are going

605
00:29:28,720 --> 00:29:32,560
to be the the real life of most
of the operations are are they

606
00:29:32,560 --> 00:29:34,920
objective enough that people are
comfortable just doing that?

607
00:29:35,000 --> 00:29:38,280
Yeah, it the answer is they can
be.

608
00:29:38,440 --> 00:29:42,840
So it, it, it mostly shows, I
think it shows up probably most

609
00:29:42,840 --> 00:29:46,560
in mergers.
And typically stereotypically

610
00:29:47,400 --> 00:29:51,280
Republican administrations are
more likely to approve mergers

611
00:29:51,280 --> 00:29:54,480
than Democratic administrations.
Now the opposite definitely

612
00:29:54,480 --> 00:29:56,040
happens.
There may be a deal that a

613
00:29:56,040 --> 00:29:59,320
Democratic administration would
block and a Republican one would

614
00:29:59,320 --> 00:30:00,720
not.
And then and vice versa, one

615
00:30:00,720 --> 00:30:03,920
that a Republican administration
would block and a Democratic one

616
00:30:03,920 --> 00:30:06,240
would not.
And so it still comes down to

617
00:30:06,240 --> 00:30:08,240
the individual.
But I think the way people

618
00:30:08,240 --> 00:30:11,000
usually perceive it as you're
more likely to have a challenge

619
00:30:11,000 --> 00:30:13,960
under a Democratic
administration of two firms are

620
00:30:13,960 --> 00:30:17,120
thinking about merging and they
think this one's a little more

621
00:30:17,120 --> 00:30:19,680
challenging, like the facts
aren't quite as strongly in our

622
00:30:19,680 --> 00:30:22,360
favor.
The general perception would be

623
00:30:22,360 --> 00:30:24,280
that's more likely to happen
under a Republican

624
00:30:24,280 --> 00:30:27,160
administration, that it is under
a Democratic one.

625
00:30:27,400 --> 00:30:29,400
And that brings up a separate
issue.

626
00:30:29,520 --> 00:30:30,320
Oh, sorry, go ahead.
No.

627
00:30:30,440 --> 00:30:32,480
I'm just going to say I'm sure
that changes with time because

628
00:30:32,560 --> 00:30:35,520
because party, because party
standards shift over as time

629
00:30:35,520 --> 00:30:37,480
goes on too.
So I'm sure we're just talking

630
00:30:37,480 --> 00:30:40,920
about the moment, you know, the
present relatively modern

631
00:30:40,920 --> 00:30:43,280
history.
Yeah, that's absolutely true.

632
00:30:43,400 --> 00:30:46,800
And one of the areas where it
sometimes comes up is there's

633
00:30:46,800 --> 00:30:50,280
this idea in mergers where you
might have a remedy.

634
00:30:50,360 --> 00:30:54,080
So suppose you have some merger
that causes a problem in some

635
00:30:54,080 --> 00:30:58,880
particular area but doesn't in
another part of the country.

636
00:30:59,200 --> 00:31:03,080
Imagine you have two firms that
are making some product, and the

637
00:31:03,080 --> 00:31:05,920
product doesn't go very far.
So if you've got a factory,

638
00:31:05,920 --> 00:31:08,880
you're serving 100 miles, 150
miles, something like milk, you

639
00:31:08,880 --> 00:31:10,320
know, just can't travel that
far.

640
00:31:10,440 --> 00:31:13,280
If you and I both own dairies
and we want to merge, let's say

641
00:31:13,280 --> 00:31:15,120
you have a bunch of dairies on
the West Coast.

642
00:31:15,160 --> 00:31:17,560
I have some dairies up in the
upper Midwest.

643
00:31:17,600 --> 00:31:20,360
And then we both have one dairy
in Florida that are right next

644
00:31:20,360 --> 00:31:22,400
to each other and there's nobody
else nearby.

645
00:31:22,720 --> 00:31:25,160
So you might, if we want to
merge, we might say to the

646
00:31:25,160 --> 00:31:28,080
government and hey, look, you're
right, we compete pretty heavily

647
00:31:28,080 --> 00:31:29,680
in Florida.
But look, there are all these

648
00:31:29,680 --> 00:31:32,240
other places we don't compete
and we think there are benefits

649
00:31:32,240 --> 00:31:35,960
for us joining.
So how about this, We will merge

650
00:31:35,960 --> 00:31:38,640
in all those other areas in the
West Coast, in the upper Midwest

651
00:31:38,640 --> 00:31:41,800
and in Florida, we'll sell,
we'll sell my dairy.

652
00:31:41,920 --> 00:31:44,400
So we'll sell it to some third
party who'll compete.

653
00:31:44,440 --> 00:31:46,920
And that way going forward, you
have the same competition

654
00:31:47,080 --> 00:31:51,320
because today you and I compete.
So that's a typical remedy.

655
00:31:51,320 --> 00:31:53,640
It's what's known as a
structural remedy, like we're

656
00:31:53,640 --> 00:31:55,880
just getting rid of some
productive assets somewhere,

657
00:31:55,880 --> 00:31:58,880
giving them to somewhere else.
That can surprisingly run into

658
00:31:58,880 --> 00:32:02,440
problems because it's sometimes
the case that it's pretty hard

659
00:32:02,440 --> 00:32:05,440
to do whatever the business is,
and you might worry that it

660
00:32:05,440 --> 00:32:07,240
wouldn't work very well
afterwards.

661
00:32:07,240 --> 00:32:11,040
So, for example, I worked on the
Kroger Albertson's merger, and

662
00:32:11,040 --> 00:32:14,000
there the parties were proposing
to divest a bunch of stores.

663
00:32:14,000 --> 00:32:17,000
They said, look, OK, these
stores are close to the other

664
00:32:17,000 --> 00:32:19,720
side store.
We'll sell one of the stores,

665
00:32:19,720 --> 00:32:21,440
and that should resolve the
problem.

666
00:32:21,560 --> 00:32:25,520
And an issue they ran into is
that there had been past mergers

667
00:32:25,680 --> 00:32:28,640
where grocery stores got
together and they divested

668
00:32:28,640 --> 00:32:30,600
stores.
And what happened in a few of

669
00:32:30,600 --> 00:32:33,520
those is any of those stores
failed.

670
00:32:33,760 --> 00:32:36,880
And so the competition didn't
get maintained.

671
00:32:36,880 --> 00:32:39,600
It would be like in my dairy
example, you and I merged, we

672
00:32:39,600 --> 00:32:42,120
sell my dairy in Florida.
The new person can't quite

673
00:32:42,120 --> 00:32:43,840
figure it out.
It goes out of business.

674
00:32:44,000 --> 00:32:47,520
And now customers in Florida, in
this example, they just have

675
00:32:47,520 --> 00:32:50,680
your dairy to buy from and they
can't play it off against mine

676
00:32:50,680 --> 00:32:53,280
anymore.
And so with those remedy

677
00:32:53,280 --> 00:32:57,240
questions, you know, one thing,
the previous administration, the

678
00:32:57,240 --> 00:33:01,640
Biden administration, they were
very strident about, consumers

679
00:33:01,640 --> 00:33:04,200
shouldn't take the risk that a
divestiture is going to fail.

680
00:33:04,360 --> 00:33:06,680
And so if you have a divestiture
that we're pretty sure is not

681
00:33:06,680 --> 00:33:09,520
going to fail, that's fine.
We'll consider that and we might

682
00:33:09,520 --> 00:33:12,280
accept it.
But we're not super interested

683
00:33:12,280 --> 00:33:15,000
in divestitures where there's
any kind of risk and we don't

684
00:33:15,000 --> 00:33:16,560
think consumers should bear that
risk.

685
00:33:16,720 --> 00:33:19,840
Another administration might
say, yeah, look, maybe it'll

686
00:33:19,840 --> 00:33:22,360
fail, maybe it won't.
And but we're we're pretty

687
00:33:22,480 --> 00:33:25,680
confident that it's likely not
to and so we'll be happy to go

688
00:33:25,680 --> 00:33:27,520
ahead.
So that's another thing that

689
00:33:27,520 --> 00:33:30,880
comes up, and it's not uncommon
to be arguing in court, like, is

690
00:33:30,880 --> 00:33:33,680
this divestiture enough to
resolve the competitive problem?

691
00:33:34,600 --> 00:33:38,480
And does that happen often in
the case that companies will

692
00:33:38,480 --> 00:33:42,960
merge and then and then they
just won't be able to conduct a

693
00:33:42,960 --> 00:33:44,600
business?
I mean, I guess the one of the

694
00:33:44,600 --> 00:33:48,440
most famous case was the was it
the AOL case in the early 2000s?

695
00:33:48,440 --> 00:33:50,680
Where would they, would they
buy?

696
00:33:50,720 --> 00:33:52,760
It was a Verizon AOL?
I don't remember what it was.

697
00:33:52,760 --> 00:33:55,240
I remember that there was a
spectacular failure in the early

698
00:33:55,240 --> 00:33:58,480
2000s with with a with a tech
company.

699
00:33:58,560 --> 00:34:01,080
Yes.
And and so that one I'm not

700
00:34:01,080 --> 00:34:04,120
familiar with, but in general
both agencies do what are called

701
00:34:04,120 --> 00:34:06,160
retrospective studies from time
to time.

702
00:34:06,160 --> 00:34:09,560
So they look back and say we
made a divestiture, did it work?

703
00:34:09,560 --> 00:34:13,360
Did it not work?
And often the answer is it

704
00:34:13,360 --> 00:34:15,600
worked.
So I worked on a beer merger

705
00:34:15,600 --> 00:34:18,560
when I was at DOJ and we
divested a brand.

706
00:34:18,560 --> 00:34:25,120
So it it was Labatt's in sort of
upper upper New York's upper in

707
00:34:25,120 --> 00:34:29,639
New York, let's just say.
And it was divested to a buyer.

708
00:34:29,639 --> 00:34:33,480
The buyer got a Brewer, a
brewery, they continue to make

709
00:34:33,480 --> 00:34:35,880
it, they continue to compete.
It all went fine.

710
00:34:36,040 --> 00:34:38,480
And then there are other ones
where, you know, for example, in

711
00:34:38,480 --> 00:34:40,800
Kroger, Albertson's, in one of
the previous deal, which is

712
00:34:40,800 --> 00:34:43,600
being between Albertson's and
Safeway, some of the grocery

713
00:34:43,600 --> 00:34:46,880
stores went out of business.
And part of the reason was if

714
00:34:46,880 --> 00:34:50,080
you think about wherever you buy
your groceries, the name of that

715
00:34:50,080 --> 00:34:52,120
is what's called in the industry
the banner.

716
00:34:52,120 --> 00:34:54,480
So if it's Safeway, Safeway is
the banner.

717
00:34:55,480 --> 00:34:57,760
Consumers are attached to that.
Like I know when I go to a

718
00:34:57,760 --> 00:35:00,400
Safeway, what I'm going to find
if I rebranded his Hills.

719
00:35:00,400 --> 00:35:03,680
And people may be like, I don't
know about this hill guy, I

720
00:35:03,680 --> 00:35:06,440
don't know about his stores.
And now I lose a bunch of my

721
00:35:06,440 --> 00:35:08,320
customers and now I'm out of
business.

722
00:35:08,320 --> 00:35:10,720
You know, something like that
happened with Whole Foods.

723
00:35:10,720 --> 00:35:13,800
Whole Foods had an earlier
merger with Wild Oats and a

724
00:35:13,800 --> 00:35:16,040
couple of the divested stores
just completely failed.

725
00:35:16,080 --> 00:35:19,080
Once you lose that brand, that
can be really challenging.

726
00:35:19,080 --> 00:35:23,320
Phasingly there's a lot of sort
of things that look like a

727
00:35:23,320 --> 00:35:27,160
remedy that might work, and yet
there's a there's nevertheless

728
00:35:27,160 --> 00:35:29,280
there's a challenge in court.
That's really cool.

729
00:35:29,320 --> 00:35:31,200
It's really, it's a really
fascinating, it's really

730
00:35:31,200 --> 00:35:34,200
fascinating examples as to how,
because, you know, you could

731
00:35:34,200 --> 00:35:36,360
just take two books and compare
them with one another and say,

732
00:35:36,360 --> 00:35:38,480
Hey, it should work out.
But there's a lot of factors, I

733
00:35:38,480 --> 00:35:41,000
guess that we don't that we that
we wouldn't naturally think

734
00:35:41,000 --> 00:35:43,880
about like like brands and and
stuff like that.

735
00:35:43,880 --> 00:35:44,880
And you're and you're completely
right.

736
00:35:44,880 --> 00:35:47,760
I mean, it's the reason why
people like to buy Rice Krispies

737
00:35:47,760 --> 00:35:50,360
instead of crispy rice, all
these or something like that,

738
00:35:50,360 --> 00:35:54,280
you know, or it's we, we have a,
we have an attachment and I love

739
00:35:54,280 --> 00:35:56,960
to get sold.
So I'm certainly, I'm certainly

740
00:35:56,960 --> 00:35:59,160
guilty of being one of these
participants.

741
00:35:59,160 --> 00:36:01,560
But I think that there is
something, I think that there is

742
00:36:01,560 --> 00:36:03,800
a value to, to brands.
And I think that you're right,

743
00:36:03,800 --> 00:36:06,600
people do have attachments and
it's really, it's really cool.

744
00:36:07,040 --> 00:36:09,840
I would love to touch a little
bit on the state's versus the,

745
00:36:09,880 --> 00:36:14,880
the state's versus federal
application of antitrust and

746
00:36:14,880 --> 00:36:19,160
monopolies and stuff, because I
didn't even really realize that

747
00:36:19,160 --> 00:36:22,480
this was, that this could have
been, it could be a state issue.

748
00:36:22,480 --> 00:36:24,880
When would this be?
When would this come up that a

749
00:36:24,880 --> 00:36:28,120
state would hypothetically have
an issue with a merger but a

750
00:36:28,120 --> 00:36:30,400
government wouldn't or vice
versa?

751
00:36:30,400 --> 00:36:33,880
And what is and how does that
get resolved between the state

752
00:36:33,880 --> 00:36:34,840
and the government?
Yeah.

753
00:36:34,840 --> 00:36:38,040
So the federal government has
the DOJ and the FTC.

754
00:36:38,040 --> 00:36:40,360
Let's just say that those are
the two biggest antitrust

755
00:36:40,360 --> 00:36:43,240
agencies.
But then most states of Florida,

756
00:36:43,240 --> 00:36:47,040
for example, will have, as part
of its attorney general's office

757
00:36:47,280 --> 00:36:50,280
will have someone who's looking
at antitrust issues in Florida.

758
00:36:50,520 --> 00:36:54,120
And so an earlier example, if we
just have a merger in Florida

759
00:36:54,120 --> 00:36:57,400
between your dairy and my dairy
and people are concerned about

760
00:36:57,400 --> 00:36:59,720
it, Florida might move in and
look at that.

761
00:36:59,720 --> 00:37:02,320
Or if it's in the, you know,
whatever state you want to pick

762
00:37:03,120 --> 00:37:05,800
could be in Minnesota there,
there's two dairies there.

763
00:37:06,000 --> 00:37:10,040
That state may look at it if all
the merging parties are located

764
00:37:10,040 --> 00:37:14,720
in that state or if they think
for some reason their consumers

765
00:37:14,720 --> 00:37:18,640
are vulnerable under the merger
and the federal government, for

766
00:37:18,640 --> 00:37:22,040
whatever reason, doesn't.
And so an early example of this

767
00:37:22,080 --> 00:37:26,520
and, and was the Sprint,
T-Mobile merger and their Sprint

768
00:37:26,520 --> 00:37:29,240
and T-Mobile were merging.
And at a high level, you could

769
00:37:29,240 --> 00:37:32,400
say there were four at the time,
large cell phone providers,

770
00:37:32,400 --> 00:37:36,080
Verizon AT AT&T, Sprint and
T-Mobile.

771
00:37:36,320 --> 00:37:39,800
Sprint and T-Mobile where I
think it's fair to say #3 and #4

772
00:37:40,000 --> 00:37:45,680
And so they were merging and the
federal government worked out a,

773
00:37:46,880 --> 00:37:50,520
a remedy, certain, some
agreement with the Sprint and

774
00:37:50,520 --> 00:37:53,200
T-Mobile will make certain
you'll do certain things, you'll

775
00:37:53,200 --> 00:37:55,840
take certain actions.
And if you do that, we think

776
00:37:55,840 --> 00:37:59,120
that the transaction is OK.
But a bunch of states led by New

777
00:37:59,120 --> 00:38:02,320
York said even with those
remedies, we still think this is

778
00:38:02,320 --> 00:38:03,960
going to hurt consumers in New
York.

779
00:38:04,040 --> 00:38:06,360
And so they brought, they
brought a lawsuit in New York

780
00:38:06,360 --> 00:38:08,400
and they actually ended up
losing that.

781
00:38:08,400 --> 00:38:12,040
You know, it is a challenging
position for the state sometimes

782
00:38:12,040 --> 00:38:15,000
because in that case, the
federal government had reached

783
00:38:15,000 --> 00:38:18,080
an agreement saying we don't
think this transaction is going

784
00:38:18,080 --> 00:38:19,800
to harm consumers in the United
States.

785
00:38:19,920 --> 00:38:21,960
And then New York says what we
think it does.

786
00:38:22,080 --> 00:38:26,000
And so that can be that can be a
challenge, You know, in the the

787
00:38:26,000 --> 00:38:29,320
dynamics in the courtroom is New
York because now the judge may

788
00:38:29,320 --> 00:38:32,600
be thinking, but wait, you guys
say it's not, but the federal

789
00:38:32,600 --> 00:38:34,480
government said it was.
Why do you have different

790
00:38:34,480 --> 00:38:36,000
positions?
And you sort of have to work

791
00:38:36,000 --> 00:38:38,040
through that.
But you can also have cases

792
00:38:38,040 --> 00:38:42,880
where, let's say 2 hospitals
merge in Wyoming and the Wyoming

793
00:38:42,880 --> 00:38:45,600
attorneys general is interested,
but the federal government just

794
00:38:45,600 --> 00:38:47,880
says, you know what, Wyoming,
you can deal with this.

795
00:38:48,280 --> 00:38:51,880
Traditionally, many of the cases
have been done by the FTC and

796
00:38:51,880 --> 00:38:54,920
the DOJ.
They've typically had larger

797
00:38:54,920 --> 00:38:57,040
resources.
These antitrust cases can be

798
00:38:57,040 --> 00:38:59,360
pretty expensive, time
consuming.

799
00:38:59,360 --> 00:39:01,720
But yeah, one thing that's
happened over the last, I would

800
00:39:01,720 --> 00:39:06,440
say four years, the the states
have really become very active

801
00:39:06,440 --> 00:39:09,920
in bringing antitrust cases on
their own groups of states or

802
00:39:09,920 --> 00:39:12,680
individual States and has really
changed things a lot.

803
00:39:12,680 --> 00:39:14,640
Like there's a whole new set of
people.

804
00:39:14,640 --> 00:39:17,400
If you're thinking about doing a
deal, you don't need to just get

805
00:39:17,400 --> 00:39:18,960
approval from the federal
government.

806
00:39:19,120 --> 00:39:21,720
You need to make sure that the
states are also on board with

807
00:39:21,720 --> 00:39:23,520
your merger.
I don't know, lose.

808
00:39:23,560 --> 00:39:24,920
Each other.
Hang on.

809
00:39:24,920 --> 00:39:28,280
I think, OK, sorry about that.
We had an extended break longer

810
00:39:28,280 --> 00:39:31,080
than I wanted.
But my question was, I'm sorry

811
00:39:31,080 --> 00:39:33,920
about that.
Was is there a precedent for

812
00:39:33,920 --> 00:39:36,720
states being more involved now
in antitrust?

813
00:39:36,720 --> 00:39:40,840
Is this, do you think, temporary
thing because of a cultural or

814
00:39:40,840 --> 00:39:44,320
social phenomenon that's going
on or do you or what do you

815
00:39:44,320 --> 00:39:46,840
think is the reason why so many
states are getting involved as

816
00:39:46,840 --> 00:39:48,040
opposed to the federal
government?

817
00:39:48,200 --> 00:39:49,880
Yeah, it's an interesting
question.

818
00:39:50,120 --> 00:39:53,320
I definitely think they have
become more involved and I don't

819
00:39:53,320 --> 00:39:59,160
think it's as simple as, I mean,
antitrust has now become in some

820
00:39:59,160 --> 00:40:01,360
ways a more popular political
issue.

821
00:40:01,400 --> 00:40:05,040
There used to be something of a
sort of a consensus of consensus

822
00:40:05,040 --> 00:40:09,360
view of antitrust and there's
been attacks on that in various

823
00:40:09,360 --> 00:40:12,320
ways.
And so now there's maybe more

824
00:40:12,320 --> 00:40:15,680
diverse opinions.
And so different states just see

825
00:40:15,680 --> 00:40:19,280
things differently, and they're
moving forward with cases that

826
00:40:19,280 --> 00:40:21,960
in the past, you know, at the
beginning of my career,

827
00:40:21,960 --> 00:40:24,960
certainly.
It was not uncommon for states

828
00:40:24,960 --> 00:40:27,680
to be involved.
So the federal government filed

829
00:40:27,680 --> 00:40:30,520
A lawsuit.
Some states would join, but

830
00:40:30,520 --> 00:40:34,200
usually the federal government
was doing most of the actual

831
00:40:34,200 --> 00:40:36,440
litigating.
And now you have states doing

832
00:40:36,440 --> 00:40:38,760
cases that have never involved
the federal government.

833
00:40:38,840 --> 00:40:42,280
And you know, in the Live Nation
case, for example, the federal

834
00:40:42,280 --> 00:40:46,200
government settled and then the
states went ahead and, and there

835
00:40:46,200 --> 00:40:47,840
are, there are definitely other
examples.

836
00:40:47,840 --> 00:40:52,120
And you know, a little while, it
was a little while ago, but

837
00:40:52,120 --> 00:40:53,600
there's also the Sprint T-Mobile
case.

838
00:40:53,600 --> 00:40:57,600
So you know, now the, the states
are in there also bringing these

839
00:40:57,600 --> 00:40:59,680
cases.
And it's just a, it's a real

840
00:40:59,680 --> 00:41:01,640
shift.
And I, I don't know how long it

841
00:41:01,640 --> 00:41:03,520
will last.
It'll be interesting to see.

842
00:41:03,520 --> 00:41:05,400
I mean, antitrust cases are
expensive.

843
00:41:05,400 --> 00:41:09,000
And so, you know, if if the
people in the states feel like

844
00:41:09,000 --> 00:41:11,120
they don't want their
representatives spending money

845
00:41:11,120 --> 00:41:12,960
that way, then maybe that'll
change.

846
00:41:13,040 --> 00:41:17,760
But for now, that's definitely
seems to be a major shift and it

847
00:41:17,760 --> 00:41:22,120
doesn't seem to be going away.
And I would venture a guess and

848
00:41:22,120 --> 00:41:26,600
say that the public sentiment at
the moment has shifted from

849
00:41:26,600 --> 00:41:29,920
issues of left to right, that a
federal government could at

850
00:41:29,920 --> 00:41:33,360
least put say, you know, say
that they're, that they're

851
00:41:33,360 --> 00:41:36,280
participating in.
And I feel, and I think a lot of

852
00:41:36,280 --> 00:41:40,680
people feel that big
corporations are more of an

853
00:41:40,680 --> 00:41:43,880
issue for for everyday Americans
than a left or right party

854
00:41:43,880 --> 00:41:45,920
member.
And so I think that the general

855
00:41:45,920 --> 00:41:48,560
sentiment at right now, they're
just my, it's just my feeling of

856
00:41:48,560 --> 00:41:51,400
the zeitgeist at the moment that
that there's just more of a,

857
00:41:51,640 --> 00:41:56,360
there's a political blame going
towards big corporations.

858
00:41:56,360 --> 00:41:58,440
And perhaps rightfully so, I'm
not sure exactly.

859
00:41:58,440 --> 00:42:01,240
I don't know enough the details,
but you know, I could imagine

860
00:42:01,240 --> 00:42:04,480
that that is what would
popularize such such a movement.

861
00:42:04,520 --> 00:42:09,680
Yeah, no, I mean, it's it kind
of in some ways it took a lot of

862
00:42:09,680 --> 00:42:12,720
people by surprise, you know,
the the building of this

863
00:42:12,720 --> 00:42:16,400
momentum for looking into the
big tech companies and for

864
00:42:16,520 --> 00:42:19,400
investigating them closely.
I think prior to all those

865
00:42:19,400 --> 00:42:22,320
investigations.
And I'm not intending to pick on

866
00:42:22,320 --> 00:42:24,840
Google at least at all.
It's just that their cases have

867
00:42:24,840 --> 00:42:27,360
been out there and have been the
most public.

868
00:42:27,560 --> 00:42:30,520
I think most people probably had
a positive view of Google.

869
00:42:30,600 --> 00:42:33,240
And then there were, you know,
from both the left and the

870
00:42:33,240 --> 00:42:35,240
right, people said we need to
look into Google.

871
00:42:35,440 --> 00:42:37,880
There was an investigation.
There were these cases.

872
00:42:37,960 --> 00:42:41,960
They lost two of them, which are
now they're trying to decide how

873
00:42:41,960 --> 00:42:44,120
they're going to remedy the the
harm.

874
00:42:44,600 --> 00:42:46,080
And, you know, that's a real
shift.

875
00:42:46,120 --> 00:42:48,880
I mean, I think 10 years ago,
Google would have been pretty

876
00:42:48,880 --> 00:42:51,200
popular with the average
consumer.

877
00:42:51,200 --> 00:42:54,160
And so it is a fascinating
development.

878
00:42:54,160 --> 00:42:57,680
And yes, it's not entirely clear
what's driving.

879
00:42:58,160 --> 00:43:01,280
You, you could almost imagine by
the way, I and I was, I was

880
00:43:01,280 --> 00:43:03,360
curious about this while I was
thinking about this in the MO,

881
00:43:03,600 --> 00:43:05,920
while we're thinking about our
conversation was there's an

882
00:43:05,920 --> 00:43:09,480
enormous amount of competition
in the AI world, which seemingly

883
00:43:09,480 --> 00:43:14,960
strouted from the enormous tech
world of Google and Amazon and

884
00:43:14,960 --> 00:43:17,840
Meta.
But, and, and you have kind of

885
00:43:17,840 --> 00:43:21,400
this company open AI with that
was the real forefront of the AI

886
00:43:21,400 --> 00:43:23,960
world and almost did feel like
they were unanimous with the,

887
00:43:24,040 --> 00:43:27,760
with the AI movement, at least
in the from the consumer level

888
00:43:27,760 --> 00:43:29,400
or from a very superficial
level.

889
00:43:29,720 --> 00:43:34,600
And all of a sudden with and,
and perhaps it coincides as far

890
00:43:34,600 --> 00:43:38,440
as time goes with the scrutiny
on the big tech companies, but

891
00:43:38,600 --> 00:43:42,480
there was an explosion of, of a
variety of, of very successful

892
00:43:42,480 --> 00:43:45,640
AI companies, including
Anthropic and Claude, which are

893
00:43:45,640 --> 00:43:48,000
which just got the trillion,
almost a trillion dollar

894
00:43:48,080 --> 00:43:50,360
valuation after just five years
of existence.

895
00:43:50,640 --> 00:43:54,120
And so you that that that market
seems extremely competitive, but

896
00:43:54,120 --> 00:43:57,000
it's funny that they comes out
of such a out of a market that

897
00:43:57,000 --> 00:44:00,120
only had a few player.
Yeah, no, it is very

898
00:44:00,120 --> 00:44:04,160
interesting.
And you know, I think something

899
00:44:04,160 --> 00:44:07,440
similar.
Well, a couple of thoughts.

900
00:44:07,440 --> 00:44:10,760
One early in my career, I worked
on a case that involved like

901
00:44:10,760 --> 00:44:12,760
text to speech.
You know, when you used to call

902
00:44:12,760 --> 00:44:15,960
the airline and say, hey, I want
a flight and it would say please

903
00:44:15,960 --> 00:44:18,240
enter the first 3 digits of your
city name.

904
00:44:18,240 --> 00:44:20,600
And then you never understood
what you're talking about and

905
00:44:20,600 --> 00:44:22,680
you ended up just an operator
operator.

906
00:44:23,200 --> 00:44:26,520
And like those early, there was
an early case about like, you

907
00:44:26,520 --> 00:44:28,960
know, a couple people had that
tech were like merging and it

908
00:44:28,960 --> 00:44:30,360
was like the type is so
terrible.

909
00:44:30,360 --> 00:44:34,320
Will anyone notice or not?
And now AI is so, so much better

910
00:44:34,320 --> 00:44:35,920
at that.
You know, the other day I got an

911
00:44:35,920 --> 00:44:38,160
e-mail and it's we dropped a
response for you.

912
00:44:38,360 --> 00:44:41,040
It wasn't perfect, but it was
not just coherent.

913
00:44:41,040 --> 00:44:45,000
It was like using turns of
phrase that I use in my very

914
00:44:45,000 --> 00:44:48,160
idiosyncratic punctuation, like
the way I always write my last

915
00:44:48,160 --> 00:44:50,760
name and H just because it's
quicker, like I don't have to

916
00:44:50,760 --> 00:44:52,200
write Nicholas or Ridiculous
Hill.

917
00:44:52,440 --> 00:44:54,640
And it did that.
And, you know, obviously it's

918
00:44:54,640 --> 00:44:57,360
drawing all this data in and
trying to make things come out

919
00:44:57,360 --> 00:44:59,080
and that, you know, that is
coming.

920
00:44:59,280 --> 00:45:01,920
Look, this is one of those
things I've observed over my

921
00:45:01,920 --> 00:45:05,280
career that new technologies
create a lot of anxiety.

922
00:45:05,280 --> 00:45:08,160
Like, what is it going to do?
How is it going to affect me?

923
00:45:08,400 --> 00:45:11,080
And the more powerful a
technology seems, the more

924
00:45:11,080 --> 00:45:13,440
threatening it is.
Like we don't know what the end

925
00:45:13,440 --> 00:45:16,240
game is going to be.
We don't know who it's going to

926
00:45:16,240 --> 00:45:20,200
replace, whose jobs are going to
disappear or how your day-to-day

927
00:45:20,200 --> 00:45:22,240
life will change.
And that creates anxiety and

928
00:45:22,240 --> 00:45:25,080
people worry about it.
And then to your point, you

929
00:45:25,080 --> 00:45:28,920
know, it's a little bit like,
you know, was it 20 years ago,

930
00:45:28,920 --> 00:45:32,120
30 years ago, Microsoft was in a
very strong position with

931
00:45:32,120 --> 00:45:34,800
operating systems on computers.
It seemed like they had the

932
00:45:34,800 --> 00:45:37,200
whole world locked up.
And then here came the

933
00:45:37,200 --> 00:45:43,160
smartphone and Apple had the
first really interconnected, You

934
00:45:43,160 --> 00:45:45,440
know, the iPhone came out and
people like this, this is

935
00:45:45,440 --> 00:45:47,400
amazing.
And then rivals appeared.

936
00:45:47,480 --> 00:45:49,080
Microsoft tried to get into that
game.

937
00:45:49,080 --> 00:45:51,760
They had their own operating
system for a while, and nobody

938
00:45:51,760 --> 00:45:53,800
really liked it.
And so it kind of disappeared

939
00:45:53,800 --> 00:45:57,200
from the market.
And now it's kind of Samsung and

940
00:45:57,680 --> 00:45:59,120
Apple.
And then, you know, there's

941
00:45:59,120 --> 00:46:02,520
other players, like I have a
Pixel phone and that world is

942
00:46:02,520 --> 00:46:05,280
kind of it's your point, like
you might have guessed,

943
00:46:05,280 --> 00:46:08,120
Microsoft will definitely be the
next person.

944
00:46:08,120 --> 00:46:09,960
They'll dominate the cellular
thing because they know how to

945
00:46:09,960 --> 00:46:12,000
do operating systems and yet it
didn't happen.

946
00:46:12,000 --> 00:46:15,320
And you're right, IAI, it seems
like there's hundreds of people

947
00:46:15,320 --> 00:46:18,840
out there fighting to be on the
top and who's going to be there?

948
00:46:18,840 --> 00:46:21,920
And the royal for antitrust
eventually will be, you know, if

949
00:46:21,920 --> 00:46:25,080
someone gets into a strong
position, are they using their

950
00:46:25,080 --> 00:46:28,560
strong position to exclude
rivals like antitrust?

951
00:46:28,560 --> 00:46:31,640
People are happy when firms
compete with each other because

952
00:46:31,640 --> 00:46:34,280
that competing with each other
makes consumers better off.

953
00:46:34,520 --> 00:46:38,800
They don't like it when you do.
You find some way, potentially

954
00:46:38,800 --> 00:46:42,120
underhanded way to present
prevent people from competing

955
00:46:42,120 --> 00:46:44,680
with you.
And as of now, I agree with you.

956
00:46:44,680 --> 00:46:46,360
It just seems like the wild,
Wild West.

957
00:46:46,360 --> 00:46:48,280
There's just lots of people out
there doing it.

958
00:46:48,280 --> 00:46:51,400
So who knows where it'll end up.
But it is a fascinating and

959
00:46:51,400 --> 00:46:54,160
anxiety inducing, you know,
development.

960
00:46:54,320 --> 00:46:56,760
It's it certainly is.
It certainly is.

961
00:46:56,880 --> 00:46:58,600
It's funny.
I just did I think actually my

962
00:46:58,600 --> 00:47:02,720
last podcast episode that I
recorded was with former CFO of

963
00:47:02,720 --> 00:47:04,880
Pixar when he took the company
public.

964
00:47:04,880 --> 00:47:08,960
He was selected by Steve Jobs to
to do it ordinarily sweet and

965
00:47:08,960 --> 00:47:11,240
intelligent guy.
And one thing that he was

966
00:47:11,240 --> 00:47:13,640
describing to me, one of the
challenges that he would that he

967
00:47:13,640 --> 00:47:17,880
describes was when it was Pixar
was in a Pixar also started by

968
00:47:17,880 --> 00:47:21,040
Steve Jobs had $50 million
invested into the privately by

969
00:47:21,040 --> 00:47:24,280
himself into the company to fund
it at a low point in his career

970
00:47:24,280 --> 00:47:26,040
after he was already tossed out
from Apple.

971
00:47:26,360 --> 00:47:31,120
And they and he says, you know,
I I started Pixar has had four

972
00:47:31,120 --> 00:47:33,880
main businesses.
Three of them were awful and the

973
00:47:33,880 --> 00:47:37,400
only one that was left was
motion pictures and there and

974
00:47:37,400 --> 00:47:39,920
you're stuck dealing with
Disney, you know, who's the

975
00:47:39,920 --> 00:47:44,120
absolute behemoth and he's like,
and we had, and then Steve Jobs

976
00:47:44,120 --> 00:47:47,160
calls me and he goes, we need to
negotiate with Disney.

977
00:47:47,160 --> 00:47:50,800
We have like a 10 year contract
with them and they get 8090% of

978
00:47:50,800 --> 00:47:54,160
the money, you know, of the
revenue and, and all the, and

979
00:47:54,160 --> 00:47:58,720
then any kind of, I think any,
the second, any sequel to any

980
00:47:58,720 --> 00:48:01,360
movie did not count as original
IP that was going to the

981
00:48:01,360 --> 00:48:04,000
contract.
And it felt like, and he said

982
00:48:04,040 --> 00:48:07,640
you, you were just fighting this
enormous, enormous behemoth.

983
00:48:07,800 --> 00:48:09,720
And somehow we did it.
Somehow we kind of just poked

984
00:48:09,720 --> 00:48:11,280
this little hole in it.
And we had this, you know, we

985
00:48:11,280 --> 00:48:13,680
had this enormous overnight
success with Toy Story.

986
00:48:13,880 --> 00:48:18,160
And all of a sudden, overnight,
despite how enormous Disney was,

987
00:48:18,360 --> 00:48:21,600
Pixar became a legitimate enough
player that we were able to go

988
00:48:21,600 --> 00:48:25,680
to the the biggest names and the
most powerful names in industry

989
00:48:25,800 --> 00:48:27,480
and say, Hey, we want to see it
at the table.

990
00:48:27,480 --> 00:48:29,800
We're going to read, we're going
to, we're going to renegotiate

991
00:48:29,800 --> 00:48:32,320
our contract and we're going to
change the terms and, and make a

992
00:48:32,320 --> 00:48:35,440
little more favorable to us.
So it shows that this kind of

993
00:48:35,440 --> 00:48:38,560
could be done without even
needing any kind of government

994
00:48:38,560 --> 00:48:40,560
or formal intervention.
It shows that if you kind of

995
00:48:40,560 --> 00:48:43,640
leave the market by itself and
you have individuals like the

996
00:48:43,640 --> 00:48:47,120
Steve Jobs or the Apples or the
Pixar's of the world, that that,

997
00:48:47,400 --> 00:48:49,560
that, that, that that they could
really shake things up.

998
00:48:49,560 --> 00:48:51,440
It's similar, like you said,
with microphone, Microsoft and

999
00:48:51,440 --> 00:48:53,600
the phones that, that, that,
that, that that can really

1000
00:48:53,600 --> 00:48:55,440
happen.
And it's really, really

1001
00:48:55,440 --> 00:49:00,160
wonderful.
And one thing that might make it

1002
00:49:00,160 --> 00:49:02,840
a little bit more difficult, and
I would love to kind of branch

1003
00:49:02,840 --> 00:49:06,640
this into the next part of our
conversation, although you can

1004
00:49:06,640 --> 00:49:09,240
obviously respond to that first
if you'd like, is the difference

1005
00:49:09,240 --> 00:49:11,080
between a monopoly and a
conglomeration?

1006
00:49:11,280 --> 00:49:13,760
Because I think that that's kind
of the direction that we're

1007
00:49:13,760 --> 00:49:15,360
heading towards.
And maybe you could just give me

1008
00:49:15,360 --> 00:49:17,600
some thoughts on what, you know,
what, if you have any?

1009
00:49:17,600 --> 00:49:20,480
If not, we could just jump into
that conglomeration idea.

1010
00:49:20,520 --> 00:49:23,040
Yeah, Yeah, I'll give you, I'll
give you thoughts on that.

1011
00:49:23,040 --> 00:49:25,560
First one that that actually
you've identified what's a key

1012
00:49:25,560 --> 00:49:28,160
issue in antitrust.
Like, for example, if you're

1013
00:49:28,160 --> 00:49:31,280
thinking about a merger, so you
and I are thinking of merging

1014
00:49:31,280 --> 00:49:36,240
our lemonade stands and we are
the only two lemonade stands in

1015
00:49:36,240 --> 00:49:39,280
Washington, DC or Florida,
wherever you want.

1016
00:49:40,600 --> 00:49:42,520
It's not that hard to make a
lemonade stand.

1017
00:49:42,640 --> 00:49:46,040
So like if you and I merge and
we raise prices, somebody else

1018
00:49:46,040 --> 00:49:48,480
is going to just set up a
lemonade stand.

1019
00:49:48,680 --> 00:49:50,680
And then there are other
businesses where it's a lot more

1020
00:49:50,680 --> 00:49:53,240
challenging.
Like, for example, I was just

1021
00:49:53,240 --> 00:49:55,120
talking about this with a
colleague this morning.

1022
00:49:55,120 --> 00:49:58,720
Microsoft Word and Microsoft
Excel are in a really, really

1023
00:49:58,720 --> 00:50:02,320
strong market position.
And it's just hard today sitting

1024
00:50:02,320 --> 00:50:06,920
here to imagine who is going to
replace those products and ever

1025
00:50:06,920 --> 00:50:08,960
displace them.
And so when you're thinking

1026
00:50:08,960 --> 00:50:11,920
about a merger, you often think
about it and one of the things

1027
00:50:11,920 --> 00:50:14,520
you think about is, could
somebody just start a business

1028
00:50:14,520 --> 00:50:17,680
and enter this and compete?
If so, then maybe I'm not so

1029
00:50:17,680 --> 00:50:21,200
concerned about mergers.
If though it's really hard to

1030
00:50:21,200 --> 00:50:24,600
enter or really unlikely to
enter, then maybe I do care.

1031
00:50:24,600 --> 00:50:26,640
And mergers can really reduce
competition.

1032
00:50:26,680 --> 00:50:29,920
And so one area where you often
see this is like hospitals, like

1033
00:50:29,920 --> 00:50:32,280
people don't tend to build a lot
of hospitals.

1034
00:50:32,280 --> 00:50:35,160
And so if all the hospitals in
an area were to be owned by one

1035
00:50:35,160 --> 00:50:37,840
person, you could imagine they
might have some market power.

1036
00:50:37,960 --> 00:50:42,000
And, but if we owned all the
lemonade stands, you know, you

1037
00:50:42,000 --> 00:50:44,640
just buy some lemons, you buy
some sugar, you buy some water

1038
00:50:44,640 --> 00:50:46,040
in a blender and you're ready to
go.

1039
00:50:46,320 --> 00:50:49,120
And maybe you might want
something to filter it so you

1040
00:50:49,120 --> 00:50:51,280
get rid of the lemon rind, but
it's not that hard.

1041
00:50:51,600 --> 00:50:54,240
And so that is what you're
saying is really a key issue.

1042
00:50:54,240 --> 00:50:56,560
And then you, you touched on
something else that does come up

1043
00:50:56,560 --> 00:51:00,600
too, which is, and you can also
connect to hospitals.

1044
00:51:00,600 --> 00:51:03,040
And I'll, I'll do that in a SEC.
But generally, this idea of a

1045
00:51:03,040 --> 00:51:07,800
conglomerate, I own, you know, a
potato chip business, and I also

1046
00:51:07,800 --> 00:51:12,000
own a bunch of soft drinks.
Like, is that problematic?

1047
00:51:12,000 --> 00:51:13,720
Do those compete?
Like usually if I'm thinking

1048
00:51:13,720 --> 00:51:15,320
about potato chips, I'm like,
you know what?

1049
00:51:15,320 --> 00:51:16,760
I'm not going to have a potato
chip.

1050
00:51:16,760 --> 00:51:18,080
I'm going to have a Pepsi
instead.

1051
00:51:18,200 --> 00:51:20,200
Like, that's not.
You don't think about those.

1052
00:51:20,200 --> 00:51:22,400
In antitrust, we often think
about what would consumer

1053
00:51:22,400 --> 00:51:24,320
substitute to.
Those aren't really direct

1054
00:51:24,320 --> 00:51:26,960
substitutes for each other.
But in some settings, it might

1055
00:51:26,960 --> 00:51:30,200
be the case that if you own
products that don't seem to be

1056
00:51:30,200 --> 00:51:33,160
related, they can affect each
other and they can reduce

1057
00:51:33,160 --> 00:51:35,680
competition.
And so that's where theories of

1058
00:51:35,720 --> 00:51:39,360
conglomeration start to come in.
And one area that's been a

1059
00:51:39,680 --> 00:51:42,320
pretty hot area of discussion
and people are still trying to

1060
00:51:42,320 --> 00:51:45,920
figure out how does it work, how
does it not work is hospital

1061
00:51:45,920 --> 00:51:49,120
cases.
So traditionally it was remind

1062
00:51:49,120 --> 00:51:50,600
me what city you're in, in
Florida.

1063
00:51:50,640 --> 00:51:53,080
I'm in Hollywood.
The big system here is memorial.

1064
00:51:53,080 --> 00:51:54,400
Memorial.
Healthcare is huge here.

1065
00:51:54,440 --> 00:51:56,680
Yeah.
And so you just take your local

1066
00:51:56,680 --> 00:51:58,920
hospital and the largest local
system.

1067
00:51:58,920 --> 00:52:01,560
And if they were buying the
second largest system, you might

1068
00:52:01,560 --> 00:52:04,480
say, wow, that's a lot of, you
know, hospitals that are under 1

1069
00:52:04,480 --> 00:52:06,080
owner.
That could be a problem.

1070
00:52:06,120 --> 00:52:08,200
I don't know, maybe not.
I don't know the local market.

1071
00:52:08,560 --> 00:52:10,560
But now suppose they said, you
know what we're going to do?

1072
00:52:10,600 --> 00:52:14,400
We're going to buy a bunch of
hospitals in Hollywood, CA and

1073
00:52:14,400 --> 00:52:17,520
there's no way that you are
saying, gosh, I just

1074
00:52:17,520 --> 00:52:20,560
accidentally cut off part of my
finger with my weed wacker.

1075
00:52:20,800 --> 00:52:22,320
I need to go to the emergency
room.

1076
00:52:22,560 --> 00:52:25,240
I'm either going to go to the
Hollywood hospital or I'm going

1077
00:52:25,240 --> 00:52:26,680
to drive to California and go
there.

1078
00:52:26,680 --> 00:52:27,760
You're not, that's not
happening.

1079
00:52:27,880 --> 00:52:32,720
And he's similarly, but maybe
maybe there's some way in which

1080
00:52:32,720 --> 00:52:35,880
owning those hospitals in a
bunch of states could give them

1081
00:52:35,880 --> 00:52:38,560
market power in a way that we
haven't thought about before.

1082
00:52:38,560 --> 00:52:41,080
And so people really are trying
to think about this in the

1083
00:52:41,080 --> 00:52:44,560
context of hospitals and figure
out is there an effect.

1084
00:52:44,560 --> 00:52:46,560
Now that's not quite the
conglomerate because at least

1085
00:52:46,560 --> 00:52:50,680
it's all just hospitals, but
people will also think about if

1086
00:52:50,680 --> 00:52:53,600
you what's called a vertical
antitrust case.

1087
00:52:53,720 --> 00:52:56,720
So an easy way to think about
it, I find is milk.

1088
00:52:56,800 --> 00:53:00,240
So the cows produce raw milk and
that's you can't, you can drink

1089
00:53:00,240 --> 00:53:02,440
it, but that's not what's sold
at the grocery store.

1090
00:53:02,760 --> 00:53:05,840
That milk is then processed at a
processing plant and then that

1091
00:53:05,840 --> 00:53:09,200
goes to the grocery store.
If you had a vertical merger

1092
00:53:09,200 --> 00:53:14,080
where somebody who owned all the
cows bought a lot of processing

1093
00:53:14,080 --> 00:53:17,480
plants and said we're not going
to let other people have their

1094
00:53:17,480 --> 00:53:20,920
milk at our processing plant,
maybe they would cut off access.

1095
00:53:21,000 --> 00:53:24,360
Now there's been a bunch of
cases on that and I think it's

1096
00:53:24,360 --> 00:53:27,240
really fact dependent.
So that may or may not be true,

1097
00:53:27,240 --> 00:53:30,720
but if you own an input into
somebody else's business and you

1098
00:53:30,720 --> 00:53:34,240
won't let them have it or vice
versa, you commit to not buying

1099
00:53:34,240 --> 00:53:36,960
someone else's input, you could
really damage someone else's

1100
00:53:36,960 --> 00:53:39,080
business even if you don't
compete head to head.

1101
00:53:39,160 --> 00:53:42,360
And so those kinds of theories
do exist and they're out there a

1102
00:53:42,360 --> 00:53:45,240
lot and people are thinking
about them and they're just

1103
00:53:45,240 --> 00:53:46,960
finally, very briefly, I think
you're right.

1104
00:53:46,960 --> 00:53:51,080
I mean, something of what made
people get interested in these

1105
00:53:51,080 --> 00:53:57,240
tech cases was Google and
Facebook and Ale and Amazon and

1106
00:53:57,240 --> 00:54:00,720
others, They do play an outsized
role in people's lives.

1107
00:54:00,720 --> 00:54:03,480
And so people were thinking,
these people do have a lot of

1108
00:54:03,480 --> 00:54:05,160
market power.
We really love them.

1109
00:54:05,240 --> 00:54:08,000
Is there something they're doing
that is reducing competition?

1110
00:54:08,000 --> 00:54:09,840
Because we're using their
products all the time.

1111
00:54:09,920 --> 00:54:11,840
And if they are, then we really
want to know about it.

1112
00:54:12,080 --> 00:54:15,280
Right.
Does the DOJ or FTC ever step in

1113
00:54:15,280 --> 00:54:18,920
if, and this kind of happens not
necessarily through merger and

1114
00:54:18,920 --> 00:54:22,240
acquisitions, but say Amazon is
a great example where Amazon

1115
00:54:22,480 --> 00:54:25,640
starts as a book business and
then gets into data and gets

1116
00:54:25,640 --> 00:54:30,280
into servers and gets into the,
you know, storage and then they

1117
00:54:30,280 --> 00:54:32,880
get into the film studios and
stuff like that.

1118
00:54:33,200 --> 00:54:36,160
And like you said, all of a
sudden this company has an

1119
00:54:36,160 --> 00:54:40,280
outsized proportional relevance
or impact on, on, on really

1120
00:54:40,280 --> 00:54:42,560
everyone's lives.
And they might make the

1121
00:54:42,560 --> 00:54:45,160
argument, hey, we just kind of
developed this in house in their

1122
00:54:45,160 --> 00:54:47,360
own business and this is America
and aren't we allowed to do

1123
00:54:47,360 --> 00:54:49,120
that?
And you know, this is, this is

1124
00:54:49,120 --> 00:54:51,000
just free business, isn't this?
Yeah.

1125
00:54:51,000 --> 00:54:53,200
And you're hitting what's a
really tricky issue for

1126
00:54:53,200 --> 00:54:57,400
antitrust, which is we want
companies competing as hard as

1127
00:54:57,400 --> 00:54:59,480
they can.
And when you compete as hard as

1128
00:54:59,480 --> 00:55:03,280
you can, that sometimes means
you get really big because

1129
00:55:03,280 --> 00:55:05,360
you're really good at what you
do and you become really

1130
00:55:05,360 --> 00:55:08,160
successful.
And the line is usually it's

1131
00:55:08,160 --> 00:55:11,840
fine for you to become big
through growth.

1132
00:55:12,120 --> 00:55:14,920
You know, you just do a great
job, you serve your customers

1133
00:55:14,920 --> 00:55:16,480
well.
People really want your

1134
00:55:16,480 --> 00:55:18,400
products.
Most antitrust people would say

1135
00:55:18,400 --> 00:55:20,400
that's great.
That's exactly what we want you

1136
00:55:20,400 --> 00:55:23,520
to do, get out there and try to
give the consumer a better deal

1137
00:55:23,760 --> 00:55:27,480
and win customers in that way.
What antitrust gets upset about

1138
00:55:27,480 --> 00:55:30,560
is if you say, you know what,
it's a lot of hard work figuring

1139
00:55:30,560 --> 00:55:32,800
out what customers want, I tell
you what we're going to do.

1140
00:55:32,800 --> 00:55:34,520
We're going to buy our rival
instead.

1141
00:55:34,520 --> 00:55:36,960
And that way we can get rid of
that competition and we can just

1142
00:55:36,960 --> 00:55:38,920
take it a little easy here
because we're really tired of

1143
00:55:38,920 --> 00:55:41,680
running at full speed.
Or you say, you know, we're

1144
00:55:41,680 --> 00:55:43,560
going to do something, we're
going to tell our suppliers.

1145
00:55:43,560 --> 00:55:46,240
Just making up an example.
Hey, you can do what you want,

1146
00:55:46,280 --> 00:55:49,680
but if I find out that you're
supplying your products with our

1147
00:55:49,680 --> 00:55:52,040
rival, we're not going to buy
from you anymore.

1148
00:55:52,160 --> 00:55:54,640
And if you're the bigger
company, and I'm just making up

1149
00:55:54,640 --> 00:55:57,120
an example here, you might be
able to drive a rival out of

1150
00:55:57,120 --> 00:56:00,040
business or raise their costs
enough that you can just have a

1151
00:56:00,120 --> 00:56:02,160
little bit of your breathing
space and now you're not

1152
00:56:02,160 --> 00:56:04,320
competing for your customers in
the way you would.

1153
00:56:04,480 --> 00:56:06,400
And that hurts American
consumers.

1154
00:56:06,520 --> 00:56:11,920
And so then, yes, the FTC and
the DOJ, there are the various

1155
00:56:12,160 --> 00:56:14,640
groups there are keeping an eye
on industries.

1156
00:56:14,640 --> 00:56:17,560
And if it comes to their
attention, you know, usually the

1157
00:56:17,560 --> 00:56:19,240
way it works is somebody
complaints.

1158
00:56:19,240 --> 00:56:22,520
So a customer says, I used to
have competition for my

1159
00:56:22,520 --> 00:56:25,480
business, but now somebody is
doing this thing that makes it

1160
00:56:25,480 --> 00:56:28,720
hard for me to compete.
Another source of complaints is

1161
00:56:28,720 --> 00:56:33,120
a rival might say, hey, I used
to compete with Nicholas's

1162
00:56:33,120 --> 00:56:36,160
business, but now he's been like
threatening my suppliers and I

1163
00:56:36,160 --> 00:56:37,520
can't compete with this guy
anymore.

1164
00:56:37,520 --> 00:56:42,240
You got to do something here.
And the, the both agencies will,

1165
00:56:42,240 --> 00:56:44,480
if they get that kind of
complaint and the complaint is

1166
00:56:44,480 --> 00:56:46,840
credible, they'll look into it.
And they may or may not bring a

1167
00:56:46,840 --> 00:56:48,600
lawsuit.
They may send a letter saying,

1168
00:56:49,520 --> 00:56:52,720
Nicholas, stop threatening your
rival's suppliers or whatever it

1169
00:56:52,720 --> 00:56:54,560
is.
Or if you know whatever I'm

1170
00:56:54,560 --> 00:56:57,200
doing, I just keep doing.
They might bring a lawsuit and

1171
00:56:57,200 --> 00:57:00,040
challenge me in court.
Right, right, right.

1172
00:57:00,240 --> 00:57:03,960
And so that lawsuit would
hypothetically prevent the

1173
00:57:03,960 --> 00:57:06,400
business from expanding into
other businesses where the,

1174
00:57:06,440 --> 00:57:09,480
where the government will say,
hey, Amazon, you got, you have

1175
00:57:09,600 --> 00:57:11,880
too much of A market share.
You can't, you can't also get

1176
00:57:11,880 --> 00:57:14,240
into the movie studio business.
You can't also buy a 21st

1177
00:57:14,240 --> 00:57:16,680
century or whatever 21st century
or Lionsgate or whatever,

1178
00:57:16,800 --> 00:57:18,960
whatever it was they bought.
But that would only have to it

1179
00:57:19,160 --> 00:57:21,120
would only be the case if it was
brought to their attention

1180
00:57:21,120 --> 00:57:24,280
actively by the consumers and
they were and and and they were

1181
00:57:24,280 --> 00:57:25,560
actually having an impact on
people.

1182
00:57:25,600 --> 00:57:27,320
I think, I think they they
bought MGM.

1183
00:57:27,320 --> 00:57:32,240
So, yeah, I think so, right.
It's a nuanced dancer generally

1184
00:57:32,240 --> 00:57:36,240
expanding into new businesses.
They will generally think, hey,

1185
00:57:36,240 --> 00:57:39,880
that might be pro competitive.
So today we have a bunch of

1186
00:57:39,880 --> 00:57:44,360
people competing to sell coffee
to us and Amazon says we're

1187
00:57:44,360 --> 00:57:46,760
launching Amazon coffee.
We're going to buy a bunch of

1188
00:57:46,760 --> 00:57:49,200
beans super cheap.
It's going to be like the spirit

1189
00:57:49,200 --> 00:57:52,160
of coffee.
It's going to be cheap and it

1190
00:57:52,160 --> 00:57:54,600
may not be the very highest
quality, but boy is it going to

1191
00:57:54,600 --> 00:57:58,080
be affordable.
And you know that they might say

1192
00:57:58,080 --> 00:58:00,080
that, well, that seems like
competition now that's going to

1193
00:58:00,080 --> 00:58:03,000
put pressure on pizza and
Starbucks and whoever else you

1194
00:58:03,000 --> 00:58:06,120
buy your coffee from.
And so they might like that If

1195
00:58:06,120 --> 00:58:09,560
Amazon said, and I'm just using
this as a purely hypothetical, I

1196
00:58:09,560 --> 00:58:12,480
don't think there's any plans to
enter the coffee business.

1197
00:58:12,480 --> 00:58:16,400
But if they took some kind of
action to enter coffee and

1198
00:58:16,400 --> 00:58:19,880
restrict the ability of others
to compete, then they might have

1199
00:58:19,880 --> 00:58:22,560
an investigation.
And so that's really the key

1200
00:58:22,560 --> 00:58:27,040
thing, like the generally you're
OK if you enter an industry and

1201
00:58:27,040 --> 00:58:30,280
you just compete.
If you take some kind of action

1202
00:58:30,280 --> 00:58:33,360
that makes it harder for others
to compete, other than the fact

1203
00:58:33,360 --> 00:58:36,280
that you're competing with them,
that's when you're at risk of

1204
00:58:36,280 --> 00:58:37,960
getting an antitrust
investigation.

1205
00:58:38,040 --> 00:58:41,280
Both DOJ and FTC, they'll
certainly respond if they're

1206
00:58:41,280 --> 00:58:43,440
complaints.
But just in the ordinary course,

1207
00:58:43,440 --> 00:58:45,800
if they learn about something,
you know, then their own life,

1208
00:58:45,800 --> 00:58:48,400
they see, hey, there used to be
different coffee on every

1209
00:58:48,400 --> 00:58:50,160
corner.
And now Hill's coffee has driven

1210
00:58:50,160 --> 00:58:52,440
them all out of business.
Someone may say we should take a

1211
00:58:52,440 --> 00:58:54,440
look at Hill's coffee.
How did how did this happen?

1212
00:58:54,600 --> 00:58:56,280
Yeah.
But I would imagine and I would

1213
00:58:56,280 --> 00:59:00,240
imagine though, that this would
probably, for example, let's say

1214
00:59:00,240 --> 00:59:03,080
again, I'm sorry with the with
the studio, with the film

1215
00:59:03,080 --> 00:59:06,440
studio, with Amazon, right?
And you know, this had really

1216
00:59:06,440 --> 00:59:07,760
happened.
They got the Lord of the Rings

1217
00:59:07,760 --> 00:59:09,440
franchise and they got the
rights to it.

1218
00:59:09,440 --> 00:59:11,720
And they developed a script and
they made, I believe it's a

1219
00:59:11,720 --> 00:59:13,240
series.
I don't think I believe it's a

1220
00:59:13,240 --> 00:59:17,320
series.
And they already had the

1221
00:59:18,040 --> 00:59:20,080
tracking, they had the
operations at the marketing

1222
00:59:20,080 --> 00:59:23,080
power, they had the ability to
take a piece of tape on every

1223
00:59:23,080 --> 00:59:27,320
single Amazon Prime box that
anyone was buying and, and, and

1224
00:59:27,320 --> 00:59:30,400
stick their Lord of the Rings
logo and marketing and

1225
00:59:30,400 --> 00:59:34,920
advertising on it.
And they're entering an industry

1226
00:59:35,080 --> 00:59:38,560
with a whole nother level of
power that and, you know, I'm

1227
00:59:38,560 --> 00:59:40,280
not talking about Amazon in
particular because there are a

1228
00:59:40,280 --> 00:59:41,360
lot of studios that are doing
this.

1229
00:59:41,360 --> 00:59:44,080
Apple does this too.
I'm I'm sure, you know, Apple

1230
00:59:44,080 --> 00:59:47,240
has no problem throwing money at
a lot of, you know, they have

1231
00:59:47,240 --> 00:59:48,520
more cash than they want to do
with.

1232
00:59:48,680 --> 00:59:50,520
And they have no problem
throwing money at Martin

1233
00:59:50,520 --> 00:59:54,080
Scorsese or, or any big
director, any big actor's name

1234
00:59:54,320 --> 00:59:57,440
to be able to develop a movie
for $500 million.

1235
00:59:57,440 --> 00:59:59,280
And you know what?
But that's because we're Apple.

1236
00:59:59,280 --> 01:00:01,480
And normally no one would have
made this, you know, whatever

1237
01:00:01,480 --> 01:00:03,680
you know, the, the, the studios
wouldn't have necessarily even.

1238
01:00:03,760 --> 01:00:07,080
And created this and now because
we are in another business or

1239
01:00:07,080 --> 01:00:10,240
other businesses and we have
other forms of backing and we

1240
01:00:10,240 --> 01:00:13,520
have, we, we now have, we
therefore have I guess more

1241
01:00:13,520 --> 01:00:19,240
effective means or a better, a
much bigger advantage than

1242
01:00:19,240 --> 01:00:20,920
anyone else.
And we're just getting started

1243
01:00:20,920 --> 01:00:22,160
in the game.
Does that is that, does that

1244
01:00:22,160 --> 01:00:23,920
ever come into consideration or
not really?

1245
01:00:23,920 --> 01:00:27,440
Yeah, so nuanced answer.
It's a very interesting question

1246
01:00:27,440 --> 01:00:30,280
and I'll just give you some
anecdotes to to talk about it.

1247
01:00:30,280 --> 01:00:34,880
So I, I testified on the, the
Penguin Random House's attempt

1248
01:00:35,280 --> 01:00:37,600
to require Simon and Schuster
and I testified for the

1249
01:00:37,600 --> 01:00:40,160
government and we eventually
prevailed in court and the

1250
01:00:40,160 --> 01:00:43,160
merger was blocked.
And what is 1 issue there that

1251
01:00:43,240 --> 01:00:45,480
we said, hey, look, there's
going to be a reduction in

1252
01:00:45,480 --> 01:00:48,720
competition like authors today
can play off the members of the

1253
01:00:48,720 --> 01:00:53,600
big 5 and that this is going to
lead to lower reimbursement for

1254
01:00:53,600 --> 01:00:55,120
authors.
So they'll get paid less.

1255
01:00:55,360 --> 01:00:58,360
And that's that.
And the, the defense said, hey,

1256
01:00:58,360 --> 01:01:00,960
but look, there's entry and
expansion here.

1257
01:01:01,000 --> 01:01:05,200
And you could look, if we reduce
competition, some other student,

1258
01:01:05,200 --> 01:01:07,000
some other publisher will come
in and compete.

1259
01:01:07,000 --> 01:01:09,200
So you and they had other
arguments as well.

1260
01:01:09,200 --> 01:01:12,640
I don't mean to short give him
short shrift, but the the key

1261
01:01:12,640 --> 01:01:15,720
issue there was this one key
issue was this entry question.

1262
01:01:15,880 --> 01:01:18,720
And there it ties back to your
question, because Amazon at one

1263
01:01:18,720 --> 01:01:22,520
time tried to enter publishing.
And you know, you could say

1264
01:01:22,680 --> 01:01:26,400
Amazon has a lot of money.
They're a very large company.

1265
01:01:26,400 --> 01:01:28,400
And you might say if, well, if
they try to enter publishing,

1266
01:01:28,400 --> 01:01:31,480
they're going to be successful.
They weren't successful and

1267
01:01:31,480 --> 01:01:34,280
they're not today playing any
material role, as far as I know

1268
01:01:34,280 --> 01:01:35,920
in publishing.
It's been a while since I looked

1269
01:01:35,920 --> 01:01:38,560
at it, but they're not a major
publisher.

1270
01:01:38,840 --> 01:01:41,480
And this is one of those
interesting things.

1271
01:01:41,520 --> 01:01:44,440
You pick almost any industry,
you could say, well, Apple has

1272
01:01:44,440 --> 01:01:46,200
enough money to enter that if
they want to.

1273
01:01:46,280 --> 01:01:49,120
But from Apple's perspective,
the question is, OK, I'm going

1274
01:01:49,120 --> 01:01:51,120
to have to spend a bunch of
money to do this.

1275
01:01:51,200 --> 01:01:54,520
Is it worth my while to do it?
Or should I invest in making an

1276
01:01:54,520 --> 01:01:58,360
even better iPhone or an even
better iPad or something like

1277
01:01:58,360 --> 01:02:00,520
that?
And so, you know, you can always

1278
01:02:00,520 --> 01:02:03,680
think somebody could do it and
an antitrust.

1279
01:02:03,680 --> 01:02:06,080
The question is, would they
actually do it?

1280
01:02:06,080 --> 01:02:09,120
Like, would it be profitable for
them to do that?

1281
01:02:09,280 --> 01:02:14,080
And so in general, if firms are
trying to enter new markets,

1282
01:02:14,120 --> 01:02:16,760
they'll get a reasonable amount
of leeway.

1283
01:02:16,800 --> 01:02:20,080
You know, if to tomorrow pick
your favorite tech company,

1284
01:02:20,080 --> 01:02:23,080
let's say Google said we are
launching Google Airways and

1285
01:02:23,080 --> 01:02:26,120
we're going to fly from place to
place, people would say, OK,

1286
01:02:26,160 --> 01:02:28,920
well we'll see where this goes.
Maybe this will be great, maybe

1287
01:02:28,920 --> 01:02:30,920
it won't.
But they would generally I would

1288
01:02:30,920 --> 01:02:34,800
think the attitude of the FTC or
DOJ does airlines and I think

1289
01:02:34,800 --> 01:02:36,040
they would say let's see what
happens.

1290
01:02:36,040 --> 01:02:38,480
Like this could be new valuable
competition.

1291
01:02:38,680 --> 01:02:42,320
The way it would cause a problem
is if you know, whoever the new

1292
01:02:42,320 --> 01:02:46,440
entrant was took some kind of
actions to restrict the ability

1293
01:02:46,440 --> 01:02:49,040
of others to compete.
Like it's fine to compete on the

1294
01:02:49,040 --> 01:02:51,360
merits.
You can go in there and say we

1295
01:02:51,360 --> 01:02:53,960
are going to offer a better deal
to customers and that's why

1296
01:02:53,960 --> 01:02:56,920
we're going to win.
And if you do that, that's

1297
01:02:56,920 --> 01:02:58,720
great.
What they're what's going to get

1298
01:02:58,720 --> 01:03:01,160
you in hot water is if you say,
you know what, it's hard to do

1299
01:03:01,160 --> 01:03:05,120
that, we don't like doing that.
We're going to make it hard for

1300
01:03:05,120 --> 01:03:07,920
Efron to compete because right
now he's got a really big market

1301
01:03:07,920 --> 01:03:09,440
share.
We're going to cut off his

1302
01:03:09,440 --> 01:03:11,640
supply or we're going to do
something else.

1303
01:03:11,640 --> 01:03:14,600
That's what gets you in trouble.
But if you just go in and say

1304
01:03:14,600 --> 01:03:16,960
we're going to out compete in by
offering a higher quality and a

1305
01:03:16,960 --> 01:03:19,720
lower price, generally people
will be saying that's fine,

1306
01:03:19,840 --> 01:03:21,280
there's no antitrust problem
now.

1307
01:03:21,480 --> 01:03:22,440
That's it.
That's cool.

1308
01:03:22,440 --> 01:03:26,120
That's very interesting.
I am curious though, you would

1309
01:03:26,560 --> 01:03:29,400
again, you know, back just to
the Hollywood example and this

1310
01:03:29,400 --> 01:03:31,760
could apply this to any industry
you want, but it does make a

1311
01:03:31,760 --> 01:03:34,560
difference when you know,
obviously you're correct.

1312
01:03:34,560 --> 01:03:37,440
Zon is not guaranteed success in
the, you know, in the in the

1313
01:03:37,440 --> 01:03:38,720
film, in the movie, in the movie
space.

1314
01:03:38,720 --> 01:03:40,160
And neither is it and neither is
Amazon.

1315
01:03:40,200 --> 01:03:41,840
I mean, historically, I don't
even think they have been

1316
01:03:41,840 --> 01:03:44,400
particularly, you know, they're
there as far as the Nielsen

1317
01:03:44,400 --> 01:03:47,000
charts and as far as the eyes on
the screen, you know, they're,

1318
01:03:47,040 --> 01:03:50,880
they're, they're far from the
top, but they do affect the

1319
01:03:51,040 --> 01:03:54,040
competition chain and the actual
mark and the ability to get

1320
01:03:54,040 --> 01:03:56,720
movies made.
If, and I think Netflix even

1321
01:03:56,720 --> 01:03:59,640
started this practice where they
say, hey, Adam Sandler, your

1322
01:03:59,640 --> 01:04:01,400
typical rate for a movie is $100
million.

1323
01:04:01,400 --> 01:04:03,920
We'll give you $300 million.
And all of a sudden you're just

1324
01:04:03,920 --> 01:04:07,120
completely changing the entire
scape of, of what the, of what

1325
01:04:07,120 --> 01:04:09,240
the industry is.
Do you say that that's just

1326
01:04:09,240 --> 01:04:11,760
natural, That's natural part for
the course competition.

1327
01:04:11,760 --> 01:04:14,440
We'll see what comes out of it.
Or do you say, Hey, you're too

1328
01:04:14,440 --> 01:04:17,000
busy changing the game And, and,
and you're, you're causing a

1329
01:04:17,000 --> 01:04:19,400
real rapid change in a lot of
this stuff.

1330
01:04:19,400 --> 01:04:22,080
And, and, and right now, and by
the way, consumers do suffer

1331
01:04:22,080 --> 01:04:23,920
from that.
And, and I'm and, you know, and

1332
01:04:23,920 --> 01:04:27,440
I'm sure that people say that,
that, hey, we're not necessarily

1333
01:04:27,440 --> 01:04:30,920
thrilled with the fact that we
have to that, that, that XY and

1334
01:04:30,920 --> 01:04:32,760
Z contents not great.
And we're paying a lot of money

1335
01:04:32,760 --> 01:04:34,840
for it.
Or, you know, their excuse that

1336
01:04:34,840 --> 01:04:38,000
why, why our membership costs
are going up twice or three

1337
01:04:38,000 --> 01:04:40,800
times a year is because they're
putting out more content.

1338
01:04:40,800 --> 01:04:44,320
But, you know, I mean, no one's
asking you to put bid $500

1339
01:04:44,400 --> 01:04:47,360
million for a movie that, that
could have been made for 120,

1340
01:04:47,360 --> 01:04:52,600
you know, a couple years ago.
So I, I, I am curious that is

1341
01:04:52,600 --> 01:04:56,880
this just deliberation in court?
Is this just nuance and battling

1342
01:04:56,880 --> 01:04:58,720
this out intellectually?
Is that is that really what a

1343
01:04:58,720 --> 01:05:00,400
lot of this comes down to?
Yeah.

1344
01:05:00,400 --> 01:05:04,600
So backing up, I'll take your
Amazon purchase of MGM.

1345
01:05:06,000 --> 01:05:08,880
So what the the review process
there?

1346
01:05:08,880 --> 01:05:11,920
I think one way you could think
about it is to switch the

1347
01:05:11,920 --> 01:05:14,040
context and think about
airlines.

1348
01:05:14,080 --> 01:05:19,040
So suppose American was for sale
and United said we want to buy

1349
01:05:19,040 --> 01:05:22,280
American.
This was this was rumored in the

1350
01:05:22,280 --> 01:05:23,480
press.
I have no idea if there's any

1351
01:05:23,480 --> 01:05:25,800
truth to it or not, whether
they're considering it or not.

1352
01:05:25,960 --> 01:05:28,840
But if that did happen, then I
think what DOJ would say is,

1353
01:05:28,840 --> 01:05:32,480
well, today you guys overlap and
compete on a bunch of routes.

1354
01:05:32,480 --> 01:05:36,120
Like today there are routes
where customers are choosing or

1355
01:05:36,120 --> 01:05:39,080
considering between American and
United and potentially other

1356
01:05:39,080 --> 01:05:42,240
competitors.
And so they would take a look at

1357
01:05:42,240 --> 01:05:48,000
that if Apple came in and said
we are buying Puja Savers for

1358
01:05:48,000 --> 01:05:50,880
sale American, we're buying
American then or we're buying

1359
01:05:50,880 --> 01:05:53,920
United, whichever one DOJ would
certainly be entrusted and say,

1360
01:05:53,920 --> 01:05:57,080
OK, what are the effects here?
But they would probably say,

1361
01:05:57,080 --> 01:06:01,200
well, you don't today compete to
fly people from place to place.

1362
01:06:01,200 --> 01:06:04,960
So I guess this could reduce
competition, but I don't really

1363
01:06:04,960 --> 01:06:08,200
see the issue.
And so in all of these things,

1364
01:06:08,200 --> 01:06:10,920
when somebody buys somebody
else, it comes sort of down to

1365
01:06:11,360 --> 01:06:14,560
if you're both competing to
serve the same customers today.

1366
01:06:14,600 --> 01:06:17,240
So you're competing with each
other head to head every day.

1367
01:06:17,400 --> 01:06:20,280
The more you do that, the more
if you try to merge, the

1368
01:06:20,280 --> 01:06:23,160
government's going to say wait a
minute for a lot of customers,

1369
01:06:23,160 --> 01:06:25,920
you 2 are among their best
options and you're saying you're

1370
01:06:25,920 --> 01:06:27,800
going to merge and not compete
for them anymore.

1371
01:06:27,960 --> 01:06:30,280
We want to know whether what's
going to make them worse off?

1372
01:06:30,280 --> 01:06:31,880
Is that going to reduce their
options?

1373
01:06:31,960 --> 01:06:33,960
So the same thing with Amazon
and MGM.

1374
01:06:34,120 --> 01:06:35,800
Are you both making a lot of
movies?

1375
01:06:35,800 --> 01:06:37,880
If so, are there other
competitors?

1376
01:06:37,880 --> 01:06:39,640
Is this going to reduce
competition?

1377
01:06:39,640 --> 01:06:41,880
What does that all look like in
that big picture?

1378
01:06:42,000 --> 01:06:43,240
And I.
Didn't look at industry

1379
01:06:43,240 --> 01:06:47,280
disruption as a whole.
Sorry, I'd say, yeah, sorry.

1380
01:06:47,280 --> 01:06:49,320
So an industry disruption,
really.

1381
01:06:49,320 --> 01:06:52,680
Again, I would call the price of
going up triple the price.

1382
01:06:52,680 --> 01:06:55,880
I would call that a disruption
in the industry, wouldn't you?

1383
01:06:56,360 --> 01:06:58,640
Yeah.
So it would depend like remember

1384
01:06:58,640 --> 01:07:02,280
in an antitrust merger, well,
there's two kinds of antitrust

1385
01:07:02,280 --> 01:07:05,160
mergers.
One reviews 1 is before the deal

1386
01:07:05,160 --> 01:07:07,560
happens.
So United says we're buying

1387
01:07:07,560 --> 01:07:09,920
American or Apple says we're
buying American.

1388
01:07:10,720 --> 01:07:14,880
The, the, the DOJ and the court
have to make a decision where

1389
01:07:14,880 --> 01:07:17,960
the states have to make a
decision before they know what's

1390
01:07:17,960 --> 01:07:19,920
going to happen.
So it's a really, if you think

1391
01:07:19,920 --> 01:07:23,880
about a normal crime and this, I
mean, I'm, you know, it's not a,

1392
01:07:24,000 --> 01:07:27,320
it's a different kind of issue.
But if you think about theft,

1393
01:07:27,440 --> 01:07:30,560
like you asked the question, did
Nicholas steal money from FM or

1394
01:07:30,560 --> 01:07:32,520
not?
And if I did, if I stole that

1395
01:07:32,720 --> 01:07:35,440
picture that's on the wall
behind you, it's like, OK, he's

1396
01:07:35,440 --> 01:07:36,720
got it.
He did it or he didn't.

1397
01:07:36,840 --> 01:07:38,760
You wouldn't be able to go to
court and say, I think Nicholas

1398
01:07:38,760 --> 01:07:41,280
is planning to steal my poster.
People would say, OK, well,

1399
01:07:41,280 --> 01:07:44,080
that's great, but let us know
when he does and then we'll take

1400
01:07:44,080 --> 01:07:46,600
action.
In antitrust mergers, you have

1401
01:07:46,600 --> 01:07:48,360
to make a decision before it
happens.

1402
01:07:48,520 --> 01:07:52,560
That said, there are cases in
antitrust where people have gone

1403
01:07:52,560 --> 01:07:55,720
back and said, hey, by the way,
we didn't think there was a

1404
01:07:55,720 --> 01:07:58,640
problem here, but you guys
merged and then you raised price

1405
01:07:58,640 --> 01:08:01,000
500%.
So it looks like we got

1406
01:08:01,000 --> 01:08:03,040
something wrong.
So we need to look at this

1407
01:08:03,360 --> 01:08:04,400
there.
Were cases of.

1408
01:08:04,400 --> 01:08:07,600
That yeah, yeah.
There's a famous hospital case

1409
01:08:07,600 --> 01:08:10,840
called the Evanston case where
two hospital systems merged.

1410
01:08:11,480 --> 01:08:14,400
And afterwards the FTC said, we
can't help but notice that you

1411
01:08:14,400 --> 01:08:18,040
guys have raised price since you
merged and you raised price more

1412
01:08:18,040 --> 01:08:20,080
than other people.
And it seems like maybe that

1413
01:08:20,080 --> 01:08:23,680
merger is anti competitive.
And then the FTC won and they

1414
01:08:23,680 --> 01:08:26,760
ended up, I can't remember what
the exact remedy was.

1415
01:08:26,760 --> 01:08:31,319
But so to your point, if you
merge, let's say you and I merge

1416
01:08:31,319 --> 01:08:34,880
and we raise our lemonade prices
500% and the government comes in

1417
01:08:34,880 --> 01:08:36,880
and says, well, guys, you know
what?

1418
01:08:36,880 --> 01:08:39,479
I think I see a problem here.
We might be in trouble.

1419
01:08:39,560 --> 01:08:43,359
Or here's where we might not be
if we said, hey, we did raise

1420
01:08:43,359 --> 01:08:45,720
price 500%.
But here's what you should know.

1421
01:08:45,920 --> 01:08:48,800
The price of lemons and sugar
went up 500%.

1422
01:08:48,800 --> 01:08:51,240
That's why we raise price
because otherwise we'd be

1423
01:08:51,240 --> 01:08:52,800
selling all this stuff for a
loss.

1424
01:08:52,960 --> 01:08:55,960
And by the way, go down the
street from us and we're not

1425
01:08:55,960 --> 01:08:57,680
making any money like we're
making.

1426
01:08:57,720 --> 01:09:01,000
In fact, our margin amount we
make on a glass of lemonade is

1427
01:09:01,000 --> 01:09:03,160
exactly the same as before we
merge.

1428
01:09:03,640 --> 01:09:05,960
If those were the facts, then
we'd have a good story.

1429
01:09:06,279 --> 01:09:09,720
If it was the case that lemons
and sugar didn't change price

1430
01:09:09,720 --> 01:09:12,240
and water didn't change price,
and you and I just jacked up the

1431
01:09:12,240 --> 01:09:15,479
price 500% after the burger,
we'd probably be in pretty hot

1432
01:09:15,479 --> 01:09:17,800
water.
So I hope so.

1433
01:09:17,960 --> 01:09:19,439
I would hope so.
Yeah, Exactly.

1434
01:09:19,960 --> 01:09:21,439
That's that's how it's supposed
to work.

1435
01:09:22,479 --> 01:09:25,240
I would love to and now I want
to talk about this.

1436
01:09:25,800 --> 01:09:30,640
And you know, obviously as
objectively as possible is

1437
01:09:30,640 --> 01:09:32,960
there, you know, there's always,
I emailed you about this

1438
01:09:32,960 --> 01:09:35,399
beforehand.
There's always the, in a lot of

1439
01:09:35,399 --> 01:09:38,120
big industries or anything that
has regulation, quote, UN quote,

1440
01:09:38,120 --> 01:09:42,080
revolving door, the revolving
door phenomenon where people go

1441
01:09:42,080 --> 01:09:45,319
from private to public sectors
and they take with them a lot of

1442
01:09:45,319 --> 01:09:48,880
times relationships, trade
secrets, different perspectives

1443
01:09:48,880 --> 01:09:51,120
or insider knowledge that they
may have to put them in a

1444
01:09:51,120 --> 01:09:54,040
uniquely and unique position
within the company.

1445
01:09:54,279 --> 01:09:57,200
You know, so for example, when
Purdue Pharma would hire people

1446
01:09:57,200 --> 01:10:01,200
from the FDA to, after their
careers, the FDA or after people

1447
01:10:01,200 --> 01:10:03,960
at the DEA would, you know,
would, would, would get hired by

1448
01:10:04,320 --> 01:10:07,720
a pharmaceutical company.
Part of their role was to be

1449
01:10:07,720 --> 01:10:11,360
almost advisory in how, hey,
how, how do we, how do we, how

1450
01:10:11,360 --> 01:10:13,920
do we kind of avoid the
regulation?

1451
01:10:13,920 --> 01:10:16,520
How do we, how do we get around
this and, and, and succeed and

1452
01:10:16,520 --> 01:10:19,000
be as successful as a
corporation as it could be?

1453
01:10:19,000 --> 01:10:22,200
And by the way, I, I hear, I
hear where that game plan comes

1454
01:10:22,200 --> 01:10:24,080
from.
I, you know, I, I can't say I

1455
01:10:24,080 --> 01:10:27,880
like the idea, but as a, as a
consumer, but whatever, I can

1456
01:10:27,880 --> 01:10:29,080
understand where they're coming
from.

1457
01:10:29,680 --> 01:10:32,960
Does, does this, does this
happen with the DOJ and the FTC?

1458
01:10:32,960 --> 01:10:35,480
How would this manifest?
Does this happen based on

1459
01:10:35,480 --> 01:10:37,760
industry exclusively?
And it's like the DOJ and the

1460
01:10:37,760 --> 01:10:40,480
FTC, because there's so many
different cases that you're

1461
01:10:40,480 --> 01:10:44,080
taking on, you're not
necessarily inclined to be drawn

1462
01:10:44,080 --> 01:10:46,160
into one particular privatized
industry.

1463
01:10:46,160 --> 01:10:47,960
How does it, how exactly would
that or doesn't?

1464
01:10:48,000 --> 01:10:51,320
Does it or does it not work?
Yeah, So it's interesting.

1465
01:10:51,320 --> 01:10:53,640
It doesn't.
Vary a little bit by agency.

1466
01:10:53,640 --> 01:10:56,960
I would say the DOJ,
traditionally a lot of its

1467
01:10:56,960 --> 01:11:00,080
recruiting came from what was
known, I think is still known as

1468
01:11:00,080 --> 01:11:03,640
its honors program.
So it would hire attorneys

1469
01:11:03,640 --> 01:11:06,320
straight out of law school.
And so they and then they were

1470
01:11:06,320 --> 01:11:09,720
just trained and I don't know
what the percentages were, but

1471
01:11:09,720 --> 01:11:13,840
my observation was a lot of DOJ
attorneys came through that

1472
01:11:13,840 --> 01:11:15,920
route.
So DOJ was sort of recruiting

1473
01:11:15,920 --> 01:11:18,560
people fresh.
FTC definitely does that too.

1474
01:11:18,960 --> 01:11:22,040
The FTC would also say, here's
someone who's been in private

1475
01:11:22,040 --> 01:11:24,880
practice for five years.
They're good at what they do,

1476
01:11:25,000 --> 01:11:26,560
they're credible and they
present to us.

1477
01:11:26,840 --> 01:11:28,480
We want that person to work for
us.

1478
01:11:28,480 --> 01:11:31,760
Like they know how things look
on the other side and they can

1479
01:11:31,760 --> 01:11:33,880
give us a perspective we
otherwise wouldn't have.

1480
01:11:34,040 --> 01:11:36,920
And so the two eight, I'm not
one approach or the other is

1481
01:11:36,920 --> 01:11:40,760
better, but they they both
certainly I would say DOJ tended

1482
01:11:40,760 --> 01:11:44,240
to be more the honors and FTC
tended to be a mix of hiring

1483
01:11:44,240 --> 01:11:49,320
people out of it from law firms
or hiring people fresh out of

1484
01:11:49,320 --> 01:11:51,680
law school.
And then people will work at the

1485
01:11:51,680 --> 01:11:56,200
agencies and they will leave and
they will go to work at a law

1486
01:11:56,200 --> 01:11:57,840
firm.
Or in my case, they'll go from

1487
01:11:57,840 --> 01:12:02,200
working in the agency as an
economist and go to work for a

1488
01:12:02,200 --> 01:12:05,720
consulting firm.
And a couple thoughts on that

1489
01:12:05,720 --> 01:12:06,880
one.
There isn't.

1490
01:12:07,120 --> 01:12:10,320
If you think about the revolving
door, like going back and forth

1491
01:12:10,320 --> 01:12:12,880
frequently, that really doesn't
happen that much.

1492
01:12:13,040 --> 01:12:16,440
Like what happens a lot is
someone works for the agency,

1493
01:12:16,440 --> 01:12:19,400
they do it for like say 10-15
years, and then they think, I'd

1494
01:12:19,400 --> 01:12:21,320
like to try private sector and
they do that.

1495
01:12:21,520 --> 01:12:23,920
Or vice versa.
They go to the law firm, they

1496
01:12:23,920 --> 01:12:26,200
build a career, and then they
say, I'd like to see what it's

1497
01:12:26,200 --> 01:12:29,640
like being at the government.
Multiple spins through that door

1498
01:12:29,640 --> 01:12:32,440
are relatively uncommon, at
least in my experience.

1499
01:12:32,440 --> 01:12:34,800
Usually you start one place, you
might go the other.

1500
01:12:34,960 --> 01:12:38,480
Some people do there, there and
back, but that's relatively

1501
01:12:38,480 --> 01:12:41,640
rare.
And then I would say from my

1502
01:12:41,640 --> 01:12:46,080
experience at both agencies, if
you're an ex agency alumni, so I

1503
01:12:46,080 --> 01:12:49,360
worked with you, I know you.
I'm usually a little more polite

1504
01:12:49,360 --> 01:12:52,680
in my questions, but it doesn't
change the analysis.

1505
01:12:52,680 --> 01:12:56,080
Ultimately, if you come in with
a dumb story, you know, you and

1506
01:12:56,080 --> 01:13:01,080
I have done our 500% deal and
you know, an ex agency person

1507
01:13:01,080 --> 01:13:03,480
comes in and says, oh, you
shouldn't worry about it because

1508
01:13:03,800 --> 01:13:05,760
look, I mean, lemonade,
whatever, it's not that

1509
01:13:05,760 --> 01:13:07,720
important.
They come up with some really

1510
01:13:07,880 --> 01:13:10,280
reason why we shouldn't care.
The staff are going to say the

1511
01:13:10,280 --> 01:13:12,240
exact same thing.
They're going to say, yeah, this

1512
01:13:12,240 --> 01:13:15,480
isn't a credible story.
Like we still like Bob, great

1513
01:13:15,480 --> 01:13:17,000
guy.
We really enjoyed working with

1514
01:13:17,000 --> 01:13:20,000
him, but on this one, his story
doesn't make a lot of sense.

1515
01:13:20,200 --> 01:13:23,680
And then on top of that, you
have two other layers. 1 is the

1516
01:13:23,680 --> 01:13:26,520
political layer.
Those people generally are not,

1517
01:13:26,720 --> 01:13:28,960
don't have those past
relationships with works.

1518
01:13:28,960 --> 01:13:32,920
And then ultimately in our US
system, things end up in court

1519
01:13:33,040 --> 01:13:36,040
and for sure the judge has no
idea who these people are and

1520
01:13:36,040 --> 01:13:37,920
the judge is just going to look
at the merits.

1521
01:13:38,560 --> 01:13:41,240
Like in all these cases, you
work backwards from what would

1522
01:13:41,240 --> 01:13:43,520
happen in court.
Like if you and I do our merger,

1523
01:13:43,520 --> 01:13:46,800
we raise price 500% and we know
we're going to lose in court.

1524
01:13:47,040 --> 01:13:49,320
Then when we're dealing with the
agency, we're really in a

1525
01:13:49,320 --> 01:13:51,480
posture where we're saying,
let's try to figure out if

1526
01:13:51,480 --> 01:13:54,040
there's a solution or we just
have to go back to competing

1527
01:13:54,040 --> 01:13:56,800
independently.
And so those because of those

1528
01:13:56,800 --> 01:13:59,960
various layers, I, at least in
my time in the agencies, I

1529
01:13:59,960 --> 01:14:03,840
really didn't see any example
where it was, well, we kind of

1530
01:14:03,840 --> 01:14:07,320
like, you know, Janet, because
she was here and we worked with

1531
01:14:07,320 --> 01:14:08,720
her.
So we're going to say yes to our

1532
01:14:08,720 --> 01:14:10,360
client when we had otherwise
said no.

1533
01:14:10,960 --> 01:14:14,480
Ultimately, especially the
agencies, the people tend to be

1534
01:14:14,480 --> 01:14:17,720
really mission focused.
Like they do work for a lot less

1535
01:14:17,720 --> 01:14:19,800
money.
They work really long hours.

1536
01:14:19,840 --> 01:14:23,600
They're doing it because they
care about US consumers.

1537
01:14:23,720 --> 01:14:29,360
And that sort of Trump's any we
worked together once or Taos and

1538
01:14:29,400 --> 01:14:31,240
you know that at least that's
been my experience.

1539
01:14:31,240 --> 01:14:32,840
Others may have had a different
experience.

1540
01:14:33,680 --> 01:14:36,080
Sure.
And I I I totally get that.

1541
01:14:36,640 --> 01:14:39,280
And I, you know, that that makes
a lot of sense.

1542
01:14:39,360 --> 01:14:41,720
I, I was actually thinking a
little bit more along the lines

1543
01:14:41,720 --> 01:14:44,040
and to take it back to our
lemonade stands that you and I

1544
01:14:44,040 --> 01:14:46,080
have our lemonade stands.
And I know that if we Jack up

1545
01:14:46,080 --> 01:14:49,200
our prices 500%, the federal
government's going to come after

1546
01:14:49,200 --> 01:14:51,720
us.
But I do know that having spent

1547
01:14:51,720 --> 01:14:55,760
three years, you know, if I
spent three years at the DOJ or

1548
01:14:55,760 --> 01:15:00,160
the FTC and I know that jacking
up to 100%, you know, will

1549
01:15:00,160 --> 01:15:02,480
probably fly under the radar.
And so, you know, I say, hey,

1550
01:15:02,480 --> 01:15:06,000
you know, Nicholas, you know, I,
I, I had a couple of, you know,

1551
01:15:06,000 --> 01:15:08,960
I spent a couple of years there.
And I do know that we don't want

1552
01:15:08,960 --> 01:15:11,040
them coming after us.
So why don't we, why don't we

1553
01:15:11,040 --> 01:15:14,680
just stick it to what I know is
202 hundred 50%.

1554
01:15:14,680 --> 01:15:17,920
And then anything above that is
it's already getting greedy, but

1555
01:15:17,920 --> 01:15:19,280
that's also going to attract
attention.

1556
01:15:19,280 --> 01:15:24,080
I know that their XY and Z.
Yeah, I see.

1557
01:15:24,240 --> 01:15:25,000
I got.
I got you.

1558
01:15:25,240 --> 01:15:26,880
Yeah.
Yeah, that makes sense.

1559
01:15:26,880 --> 01:15:29,880
So I think, yeah.
So from the perspective of, so

1560
01:15:29,880 --> 01:15:33,160
usually, let's say our, our
joint lemonade company, we're

1561
01:15:33,160 --> 01:15:36,160
hiring an antitrust lawyer and
we say, look, if you looked at

1562
01:15:36,160 --> 01:15:39,880
the agencies, because we want
to, we want to know what you

1563
01:15:39,880 --> 01:15:43,720
know, and it's that experience
of working at the agencies can

1564
01:15:43,720 --> 01:15:46,360
be very helpful for
understanding how the process is

1565
01:15:46,360 --> 01:15:48,000
going to work.
They'll say to us, look, here's

1566
01:15:48,000 --> 01:15:50,040
how it's going to work.
You guys want to merge, you're

1567
01:15:50,200 --> 01:15:52,120
going to have to file your HSR
form.

1568
01:15:52,120 --> 01:15:53,840
That's a form you have to file
to merge.

1569
01:15:54,120 --> 01:15:56,880
Then they'll probably review it.
We might have some calls, you

1570
01:15:56,880 --> 01:15:59,000
know, like they can walk you
through the steps and tell you

1571
01:15:59,000 --> 01:16:01,640
how it's going to work.
And so that direct experience of

1572
01:16:01,640 --> 01:16:03,920
the process can be really
valuable.

1573
01:16:05,160 --> 01:16:08,520
I'm, I'm not an attorney, so I
don't really see them counseling

1574
01:16:08,520 --> 01:16:10,920
outside of, you know, when I'm
on the phone.

1575
01:16:11,880 --> 01:16:15,080
What I will say is on the phone,
what they will typically say is,

1576
01:16:15,080 --> 01:16:17,160
look, I can't tell you what to
do.

1577
01:16:17,160 --> 01:16:20,320
I'm, I'm just a lawyer here.
But I can tell you here are the

1578
01:16:20,320 --> 01:16:23,160
things that are likely going to
get you into, we are going to

1579
01:16:23,160 --> 01:16:25,480
present risk for you on the
antitrust side.

1580
01:16:25,480 --> 01:16:31,440
And if you and Nicholas merge
and F1 Hill Lemonade now is 500%

1581
01:16:31,440 --> 01:16:34,080
more, that's very likely to
attract attention and you

1582
01:16:34,080 --> 01:16:36,360
probably shouldn't be thinking
about doing that.

1583
01:16:36,880 --> 01:16:40,000
And, you know, I think there's
this risk of somebody noticing

1584
01:16:40,000 --> 01:16:43,080
and coming after you.
So in a sense, that's the way

1585
01:16:43,080 --> 01:16:45,480
I've usually seen that play out.
They give that kind of

1586
01:16:45,480 --> 01:16:48,400
assessment.
And if, and people ask, which

1587
01:16:48,400 --> 01:16:50,640
they rarely do because I'm an
economist, they usually want to

1588
01:16:50,640 --> 01:16:53,760
know what the lawyers think.
I will say, look, if I was

1589
01:16:53,760 --> 01:16:58,320
sitting in my hat at the DOJ and
I saw this case fax, then this

1590
01:16:58,320 --> 01:17:00,000
is probably the way I would
think about it.

1591
01:17:00,160 --> 01:17:02,480
And that can be value for them
to understand.

1592
01:17:02,720 --> 01:17:05,520
Look, if I saw your merger, I'd
probably tell you, I think this

1593
01:17:05,520 --> 01:17:07,080
was this one's going to get you
into trouble.

1594
01:17:07,080 --> 01:17:09,760
Like if I was the person of the
agency reviewing this, I would

1595
01:17:09,760 --> 01:17:13,040
say I've got real concerns and
it's going to take a while.

1596
01:17:13,040 --> 01:17:14,920
You're going to have to work
with the agency and go through

1597
01:17:14,920 --> 01:17:17,120
their whole process.
Or I can say, look, if this had

1598
01:17:17,120 --> 01:17:19,880
come to me when I was a DOJI
would have said, I don't think

1599
01:17:19,880 --> 01:17:21,680
it's a problem.
This merger is fine.

1600
01:17:21,680 --> 01:17:24,280
It doesn't reduce competition,
is not going to harm consumers.

1601
01:17:24,280 --> 01:17:27,440
And so that's usually how that
counseling process works.

1602
01:17:27,440 --> 01:17:30,720
I've not really seen the, hey,
I've been at the agency and I

1603
01:17:30,720 --> 01:17:33,880
can tell you guys, you're in
your new brand of lemonade.

1604
01:17:33,880 --> 01:17:38,320
You could raise price 313%, but
if you go to 314, that's going

1605
01:17:38,320 --> 01:17:40,880
to be bad news.
So go up to 313 and stop there.

1606
01:17:41,240 --> 01:17:43,760
That's not usually how it plays
out like the businesses.

1607
01:17:43,960 --> 01:17:46,080
And I just want to emphasize
that when I do work directly

1608
01:17:46,080 --> 01:17:48,880
with the clients, they're almost
invariably really nice people.

1609
01:17:49,200 --> 01:17:52,240
Often in these mergers, they're
not thinking about it in the way

1610
01:17:52,360 --> 01:17:55,680
the antitrust is.
But anyway, they're usually

1611
01:17:55,680 --> 01:17:57,920
thinking about the deal for
reasons that are sort of

1612
01:17:57,920 --> 01:18:01,120
unrelated to antitrust concerns.
And often they'll say, hey, we

1613
01:18:01,120 --> 01:18:05,240
know this area is a problem,
could we fix that problem

1614
01:18:05,240 --> 01:18:08,600
because the rest of the deal we
think is good, right.

1615
01:18:08,800 --> 01:18:10,120
OK, that sounds.
Great.

1616
01:18:10,440 --> 01:18:13,680
Well, I I want to thank you so
much for your time.

1617
01:18:13,680 --> 01:18:16,560
This was such a first of all
this hour and a half slip by

1618
01:18:17,360 --> 01:18:19,600
real quickly, but I want to say
I really enjoyed this.

1619
01:18:19,600 --> 01:18:24,400
I this was very clear, a lot of
fun and gave me a lot of insight

1620
01:18:24,400 --> 01:18:25,840
and is giving me a lot to think
about.

1621
01:18:26,280 --> 01:18:28,680
So thank you so much for your
time and for your patience and

1622
01:18:28,680 --> 01:18:31,200
your generosity with your time
and information.

1623
01:18:32,360 --> 01:18:36,280
I really, I think this is
really, really wonderful and I

1624
01:18:36,280 --> 01:18:39,320
think that this hopefully will
serve as a really good

1625
01:18:39,320 --> 01:18:42,880
educational tool for people to
have a general idea as to how a

1626
01:18:42,880 --> 01:18:45,200
lot of this stuff works, what
the government's role is.

1627
01:18:45,200 --> 01:18:48,200
And hopefully you and I covered
a lot of information that could

1628
01:18:48,200 --> 01:18:49,520
be very useful for people down
the line.

1629
01:18:49,600 --> 01:18:50,600
Thank you.
I hope so.

1630
01:18:50,600 --> 01:18:51,880
I really appreciate it.
Thank you.

1631
01:18:51,880 --> 01:18:53,320
And I had a lot of fun.
Good.

1632
01:18:53,440 --> 01:18:54,640
I'm happy to hear.
Have a great day.

1633
01:18:54,640 --> 01:18:55,440
Take care.
You too.

1634
01:18:55,440 --> 01:18:56,200
Hello.
Thanks.